Resilient Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Building Resilience against Radicalisation,
Civic Apathy and Intergroup Tension

The Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development

Content

About

About SCORE Bosnia and Herzegovina

The present iteration of the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index[1] in Bosnia and Herzegovina[2] (BiH) was implemented in 2019 – 2020 by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD)[3] in partnership with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Resilience Initiative (BHRI), funded by USAID/OTI and implemented by IOM.

The aim of SCORE BiH 2020 was to support BHRI in their efforts to strengthen positive political and social actors and discourses and provide meaningful alternatives to extremist voices and influences. SCORE provides a robust evidence base, informing policies and programmes that strengthen social cohesion by identifying challenges which may undermine cohesion and factors that contribute to community or individual resilience.

Data for SCORE BiH 2020 was collected by Prism Research between October 2019 and March 2020, with a total representative sample of 3637 respondents. A non-representative part of the sample was used to survey priority groups, namely: young citizens (18 to 35 years old) and respondents living in the beneficiary areas of the BHRI programme, resulting in a total sample size of 4570.

The SCORE Index in Bosnia and Herzegovina was first implemented in 2014 by USAID in partnership with SeeD. The research was conducted between December 2013 and April 2014 with a total sample of 2000 respondents. The overarching aims of SCORE BiH 2014 were to assess social cohesion, with a focus on intergroup relations and an outcome of readiness for political compromise and the ability to envision a shared future with other ethnic groups.

The SCORE Index uses a mixed-methods participatory research approach. This includes multi-level stakeholder and expert consultations to design and calibrate indicators and develop pertinent conceptual models that can answer the research objectives. The research utilises context-specific indicators and indicators from the SCORE library, which draws from multiple disciplines, including sociology, psychology, international relations and security studies. Following data collection and analysis, results are shared and reviewed with key stakeholders, to ensure local ownership of results and relevance of the findings and recommendations.

About SeeD

The Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) works with international development organizations, governments and civil society leaders to design and implement people-centred and evidence-based strategies for promoting peaceful, inclusive and resilient societies. Working in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, SeeD provides social transformation policy recommendations that are rooted in citizen engagement strategies and an empirical understanding of the behaviours of individuals, groups and communities. SeeD's approach focusses on understanding the root causes of societal problems by developing an evidence-based theory of change which is empirically tested using the SCORE Index.

The SCORE Index was developed in Cyprus through the joint efforts of SeeD and UNDP's Action for Cooperation and Trust programme (UNDP-ACT), with USAID funding. SCORE examines and quantifies two main components of resilient peace: reconciliation and social cohesion. Reconciliation refers to the harmonious coexistence between groups that were previously engaged in a dispute or conflict, while social cohesion refers to the quality of coexistence between people and with the institutions that surround them. SCORE also looks at culturally specific components of peace that vary across different contexts and helps build a complete understanding of societal, political and economic dynamics.

Acknowledgements

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[1] For more information on the SCORE methodology, visit www.scoreforpeace.org/en

[2] For more on SCORE Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as results, visit www.scoreforpeace.org/en/bosnia

[3] For more about SeeD, see seedsofpeace.eu

How to read SCORE

SCORE quantifies the levels of societal phenomena using indicators based on 3 to 10 questions from the SCORE survey. Using several questions to create one indicator allows us to reliably[4] measure that phenomenon from different perspectives

For example, the indicator Political Security is measured through three questions:

1. Can you freely participate in the religious practices that are important to you?

2. Can you freely express your political views even when you disagree with the majority of your community or with influential leaders?

3. Do you feel free to participate in historical commemoration days?

Map scores:
PK 8.7, DB 8.2, PRJ 8.0, DOB 9.6, BL 8.0, USK 8.6, TK 8.8, BIJ 8.1, ZDK 8.4, SBK 6.9, ISP 9.1, K10 8.2, KS 8.4, HNK 7.3, BPK 8.6, ZHK 9.6, TRE 9.6, FBiH 8.3, RS 8.6

Scale: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Scores for each indicator are given a value **from 0 to 10**, where 0 corresponds to the total absence of a phenomenon in an individual, region or in society and 10 corresponds to its strong presence. The present report contains demographic disaggregations of indicators where demographic differences are significant or relevant. For demographic disaggregations of all indicators please visit www.scoreforpeace.org/en/bosnia.

Heatmaps give the score achieved by each region in that indicator, which is calculated by taking the average of the scores that every individual achieved in that region.

Predictive models are a statistical technique used to discover the possible drivers and outcomes of an indicator. Relationships between drivers and outcomes can be positive (blue) and negative (red). They can be strongly (thick arrow) or weakly related (thin arrow) to the indicator.

Political Security - The degree to which respondents feel that they can freely exercise their political and civil rights, including participating in religious practices, expressing political views and participating in historical commemoration days.

Standardised beta weights give a measure of the number of standard deviations by which the outcome variable changes if the driver changes by one standard deviation.

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[4] Cronbach's alpha measures of scale reliability were between 0.60 and 0.97 for all indicators and combined indicators (metascales).

Introduction

This report presents key data findings of SCORE Bosnia and Herzegovina 2020 (SCORE BiH 2020). This research was carried out across BiH in order to support USAID/OTI and IOM's Bosnia and Herzegovina Resilience Initiative (BHRI) in their efforts to strengthen positive political and social actors and discourses and provide meaningful alternatives to extremist voices and influences.

Analytical Scope of Report

The analytical scope of this report is aimed at assessing respondents' civic behaviours and attitudes, their exposure to and acceptance of certain divisive narratives, and evaluating the level of resilience to endorsing these narratives, to becoming active in a hostile or violent manner, and to civic apathy. The report also measures respondents' support for particular future visions for BiH, as well as certain opinions of coexistence and the drivers of intergroup relations which influence social cohesion. The authors recognise the complexities which exist in the civic and political sphere of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this report does not seek to address the origins of these complexities or to assign political responsibility, but focuses instead on revealing perceptions that shape the current realities for citizens in BiH.

Aims of Report

The major aims of this report are:

• Investigating the extent to which people endorse ethnonationalist or religious extremist narratives, and through which sources people are exposed to them

• Assessing the risk factors which lead to support for extremist narratives and to violent civic behaviour

• Assessing levels of resilience and fragility to extreme or divisive narratives across various groups and regions

• Uncovering the resilience factors which prevent people from supporting these narratives and from using violent means in their attempts to enact civic change

• Assessing civic participation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the initiatives respondents are motivated to engage in, and the obstacles that people may face which limit their participation

• Identifying the underlying drivers of constructive and inclusive citizenship

• Measuring and mapping citizens' resilience to remaining active in the face of adversity

• Understanding the profile of different groups of citizens depending on their civic behaviour and social attitudes

• Evaluating the intergroup relations between ethnic groups in BiH and identifying which factors can lead to increased intergroup harmony or which lead to tensions

• Mapping the common ground between ethnic groups in BiH

Structure of Report

Each chapter of this report addresses a core dimension of SCORE BiH 2020. Chapter 1 details the levels of civic engagement and obstacles to engagement, assessing whether people are passive, active or violent in their engagement tendencies, before moving on to identify the drivers of positive citizenship and how people can remain active in the face of adversity. Chapter 2 assesses the level of support for certain ethnonationalist and Salafi narratives and the extent and efficacy of the sources which disseminate these narratives. It also addresses the drivers of ethnonationalism and violent civic behaviour, and finally, how to build resilience against these. Chapter 3 examines the profile of respondents based on their civic behaviour and their ideologies (mainstream, active or passive, ethnonationalist versus anti-ethnonationalist). Chapter 4 assesses the level of intergroup indicators, the commonalities between different groups, and the drivers of intergroup tension to identify how to achieve harmony between different groups.

Executive Summary

SCORE Bosnia and Herzegovina 2020 shows that there is a need for building resilience against ethnonationalism, political violence, and civic apathy. It has mapped the levels of resilience and identified which factors contribute to building resilience against different stressors and adversities. Across the country, citizens face common economic, social and political challenges, as well as mirroring forms of nationalist ideologies, which contribute to processes of radicalisation. The results herein can form the basis of policies and interventions, tailored to regions, demographic groups, and social groups. These are the key messages of SCORE BiH:

Citizens have low Civic Engagement, with seven out of ten citizens never having participated in online activism, public demonstrations or NGO meetings, and only one in ten having participated in these activities often. Although this is low, this is not as low as other European countries where SCORE has been implemented, such as Ukraine and Moldova . Although Civic Engagement has increased since 2014, the largest obstacles to engagement that respondents reported were lack of time and lack of interest. The drivers of active, responsible, inclusive citizenship included Growth Mindset, Trust in Local NGOs, Civic Satisfaction and Civic Awareness. Although Information Consumption also generates high Civic Engagement, it must be coupled with Critical Media Literacy if that engagement is to be inclusive. SCORE results also show that people are less active when they lack Access to Civic Spaces, and experience high levels of Economic Stress.

Ethnonationalist narratives enjoy high support across the three main ethnic groups and play a pivotal role in processes of violent citizenship. SCORE has identified that adoption of divisive nationalist narratives in Bosnia and Herzegovina is rooted in economic strain, exposure to interethnic conflict both past and present, consumption of mainstream media and – most importantly – the spreading of ethnonationalist narratives in intimate personal contexts: among family and friends, in the workplace or at schools, at cultural events. Nationalist ideology is a significant driver of Violent Civic Behaviour and inter-ethnic tensions and is both more prevalent and more of a threat than Salafi ideology.

There is potential to build resilience against ethnonationalist ideology and violent citizenship by focusing on key psychosocial and attitudinal factors uncovered by SCORE. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, resilience against ethnonationalism is associated with a strong civic or regional identity, frequent contact with other ethnic groups, tolerant ecumenical views on faith,

Mental Wellbeing, balanced and empathetic views of the conflict. Resilience against manifesting ethnonationalist ideologies into Violent Civic Behaviour is associated with healthy social relationships, Mental Wellbeing, interpersonal skills, Tolerant Religiosity and access to places of worship, and civic passivity. Fragility is associated with a feeling of cultural estrangement from one's own ethnic group, and a desire for a more active role in civic issues. Young men are also more fragile.

Achieving Active Civic Behaviour and combating Ethnonationalism should not be taken as two unrelated goals, as some citizens are both active and nationalistic, while others are neither. Individuals who are both active and nationalistic have lower Mental Wellbeing, feel threatened by other ethnic groups, normalise violence and extreme groups, and are fragile to being radicalised. The presence of this group highlights that not all active citizens have a positive profile. Another group which had high Active Civic Behaviour but low support for Ethnonationalist Ideology, although otherwise a very positive group, was found to be fragile to developing violent tendencies, and needs support to build resilience so that their civic enthusiasm is directed only towards non-divisive and harmonious forms of activism. On the other hand, passive anti-ethnonationalists are tolerant and harmonious but mistrustful of NGOs and have turned away from Active Citizenship. Each group has its own profile of characteristics and is fragile or resilient against different stressors. Thus, stakeholders working with either civic engagement or nationalist radicalisation should be aware of the various intersections of these two issues.

Across Bosnia and Herzegovina, intergroup relations are lukewarm, although there are some areas with alarmingly high levels of tension. The main drivers of tension were found to be a perception of cultural difference with other ethnic groups, Ethnonationalist Ideology and Islamophobia. The main prerequisite for Intergroup Harmony was frequent Contact with other ethnic groups, while satisfaction with civic life and with local institutions also played a role in alleviating negative attitudes towards other groups. Since 2014, the perception that outgroups are violent increased from 14% to 32%. Cultural Distance has increased for Croat respondents, while Social Distance has decreased for Serb respondents. Although tensions are still unresolved, there is a strong consensus among citizens in support of trying to forge a common ethnically inclusive identity (69% of respondents agree) and in support of political parties ensuring representation of all ethnic groups, not just one (74% agree). There is, therefore, an overwhelming desire for the resolution of old tensions, even if that implies untangling a difficult history and planning a precarious future.

1. Encouraging Positive Citizenship

This chapter explores civic participation and how to increase citizens' engagement in activities which achieve positive societal change. By revealing the economic, social and individual factors which drive or inhibit civic engagement, these results can be used to inform targeted interventions which seek to encourage active and inclusive civic participation.

Section 1.1 details respondents' patterns of civic engagement, comparing this to data from BiH in 2014 and from other countries in which SCORE was implemented, followed by examining which initiatives interest people, and the obstacles to participation that respondents tend to face. Section 1.2 outlines respondents' anticipated reaction to certain scenarios of civic unrest, and how these underlie the type of citizenship they display – whether it is active, violent, or passive. In Section 1.3, the foundations for developing positive civic engagement are investigated, allowing for identification of the drivers of active, inclusive, and responsible citizenship. In closing, Section 1.4 addresses the adversities that prevent respondents from remaining active and evaluates how to build resilience against these stressors.

Previous studies have identified that civic engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is low. Voting, the most common type of engagement, self-reported by 71% of respondents in this study, in reality has a low turnout and was at approximately 50% in the 2018 presidential election (ElectionGuide, 2018); youth have a low sense of agency and participation in volunteering activities (Prism Research, 2017). In addition to illustrating citizens' current patterns of civic engagement, the present study will identify the activities that are most likely to motivate citizens to become more involved, as well as the conditions and contextual factors that are required to tackle these low engagement tendencies.

1.1 Civic Engagement, Willingness to Participate and Obstacles to Engagement

The most common form of Civic Engagement for all ages is voting in elections, in which 71% of respondents engage very often or often. People often take part in charitable activities (27%). Conversely, citizens do not frequently participate in online activism, public demonstrations or NGO meetings or discussions (71%, 72% and 76% of respondents said they never participate in these activities, respectively).

Young people are slightly less likely to vote (62%, Figure 1) compared to people over the age of 35 (77%), but are more likely to participate in nearly all other forms of civic engagement, particularly volunteering, petitions, online activism and public demonstrations (Figure 1).These trends are in line with previous reports in BiH, in which signing petitions and volunteering in CSOs were among the most common activities of participation for people between the ages of 15 to 30 (MEASURE-BiH, 2018).

Civic Engagement has increased since 2014. This is evident from the percentage of respondents who participated in certain activities at least once in 2014 (SCORE, 2015) or 2019. Regarding volunteering activities, 13% reported participating at least once in 2014; compared to 38% in 2019. In 2014, 12% reported participating in public demonstrations at least once, compared to 29% in 2019. In 2014, 72% reported discussing politics within their social circles at least once, compared to 56% in 2019 (Table 1).

Civic Engagement overall is slightly higher in men than women. Respondents with a higher education level are more engaged[6]. This is particularly observed in people over the age of 35, where people who have a higher education, income and employment status are more engaged.

Figure 2 shows the scores of the indicator Civic Engagement across BiH. Civic Engagement is high in Prijedor which has an average score of 3 out of 10 (Figure 2), while Civic Engagement is the lowest in Trebinje (average score 1.2). The average level of engagement does not differ significantly between FBiH and RS, with mean scores of 2.2 and 2.1, respectively (Figure 2).

The lack of engagement on certain activities can be compared to data from other SCORE projects (Table 1). Although Civic Engagement appears low in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2019-2020, a larger proportion of Bosnian respondents participated in civic activities at least once, compared to respondents in Eastern Ukraine or Moldova[7] (Table 1). Conversely, fewer respondents in

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[6] Respondents with complete tertiary education have average scores of 2.7 in Civic Engagement, compared to 1.1 for those with no complete formal education.

[7] For more details please see www.scoreforpeace.org/en/use and www.scoreforpeace.org/en/moldova

Figure 1: Percentage of people who responded that they participate "Very Often" and "Often" in various forms of civic engagement.

Figure 2: Civic Engagement

BiH participate in civic activities, compared to respondents in Cyprus.

Respondents were asked what topics would motivate them to participate in NGO or CSO activities. Most respondents (72%, Figure 3) would be interested in initiatives that help vulnerable people, which agrees with the aforementioned findings of relatively high participation in charity activities (Figure 2). Respondents would be motivated by activities that are aimed at fighting corruption (68%) and activities which inform about or increase their economic and career opportunities (67%) (Figure 3). Respondents are

the least interested in activities which promote political parties (38%). These findings are in line with previous reports, in which helping ill people, fighting corruption, and increasing employment are the leading issues that would motivate citizens to take part in civic activities (MEASURE-BiH, 2019).

Younger people are consistently more willing to participate, and 50% of youth (18 to 35 years old) surveyed would be interested in all types of activities either a lot or a little (excluding political activities, in which 41% of youth would be interested a lot or a little). Economic and career opportunities become more important for young people, and such activities are likely to increase engagement in youth who are disengaged at present (64% of youth with low engagement would be motivated by activities that support their economic and career prospects). 76% of youth overall are interested in youth-focussed activities, such as youth centres or the involvement of youth in the community.

As with Civic Engagement, a higher education level is linked to more Willingness to Participate in Civic Initiatives, and people with tertiary education are two-fold more interested in participation than people with no complete formal education (average scores of 4.2 and 1.8, respectively). Respondents with a higher education level also have higher scores in Civic Awareness (average scores of 4.1 for people with complete tertiary education and 1.7 for those with no formal education).

% of Respondents who report that they participated at least once in civic initiatives

Table 1: Temporal and cross-country comparison of respondents who reported participating in certain civic activities at least once.

Willingness to Participate in civic life is lower on average in RS than FBiH (Figure 4), and differs at the level of specific activities between the entities. 74% of respondents in FBiH are interested in fighting corruption, compared to 56% in RS. 61% of respondents in FBiH would be motivated to participate to some extent in activities which promote coexistence, compared to 49% of RS respondents. In FBiH, 71% of respondents are interested in activities involving economic or career opportunities, compared to 59% of respondents in RS. Canton 10 respondents have high levels of Willingness to Participate (5.4 out of 10). In Trebinje, where respondents have low Civic Engagement, Willingness to Participate is also low (1.9 out of 10; Figure 4).

Respondents perceive a high presence of Obstacles to Engagement; 30% of respondents report that all of the reasons they were asked about limit their engagement to some extent. The most significant obstacle for people is a lack of time, with 53% of respondents reporting that this is a serious or very important reason for them not participating (Figure 5) while lack of interest (50% perceive this as an obstacle) and negative perceptions about NGOs also play an important role (48% cite political motives within initiatives as an obstacle, while 46% believe that civic initiatives are not effective, Figure 5).

I would be motivated to join an NGO/CSO whose activities include:

Figure 3: Percentage of respondents who said they were motivated in participating in various civic engagement activities.

Figure 4: Willingness to Participate in Civic Initiatives

1.2 Active, Passive and Violent Civic Behaviour

Participants responded to scenario-type questions which were used to characterise the nature of their civic behaviour. The scenarios looked at how citizens would react in situations of government deadlock or ethnic tension to determine whether they would react constructively and peacefully, whether they would remain passive, or whether they would generate more tension and even turn to violence.

In line with the low levels of Civic Engagement, it was observed that most respondents would take a passive stance when faced with making a change in their community or in cases of civic unrest.

When asked about what they would do to change current conditions in their community, just under half of respondents (49%) said they would do nothing and remain focused on their own personal and business affairs. This accounts for 45% of people under the age of 35, and 52% of respondents over the age of 35. People who would use any actions but definitely avoid violence make up 48% of the sample, encompassing 52% of youth and 46% of people over the age of 35. Youth are therefore slightly more likely to be active than older people. Just 3% of respondents would use all means of change available, including violence. This figure increases to 5% of males, compared to just 1% of females who would condone the use of violent means.

Obstacles are higher for respondents over the age of 35. People over the age of 35 who are disengaged are particularly likely to be uninterested in the initiatives available to them. There appears to be a significant lack of initiatives available, particularly as reported by people over the age of 35 who are currently disengaged; 90% report a lack of initiatives where they live as an obstacle to some extent. However, among youth, obstacles do not appear to effectively reduce engagement levels; the level of engagement is the same regardless of how many obstacles the respondents perceive.

Obstacles to Engagement are high in Una-Sana Canton, Doboj, West Herzegovina Canton and Trebinje. A lack of interest in civic initiatives is a particular problem in Una-Sana Canton and Doboj, where for 69% and 76% of respondents, respectively, this a serious or very important reason for no participation.

Respondents are becoming more passive, compared to 2014 data (SCORE, 2015) – 42% were passive in 2014 compared to 49% in 2019. There has been a decrease in people who would use violence if necessary (5% in 2014, 3% in 2019) but there has also been a reduction in

Do you think the following are important reasons for you not participating in the initiatives or joining NGOs/CSOs?


Figure 5: Percentage of respondents who reported certain obstacles that prevent them from participating in civic initiatives.

respondents who would be active and avoid any kind of violence (53% in 2014, 48% in 2019).

Respondents were asked more detailed civic scenario questions in order to delineate the differences in the nature of their reaction (if any) to situations of civic unrest. In these scenario questions (Figure 6, Figure 7) various response options were possible, each representing a different style of civic behaviour (from a violent activist to a passive bystander, or a peaceful participant).

Respondents were asked how they would react to protests organised by citizens in response to a situation of political deadlock, in which some protesters have clashed with the police. Over two thirds (68%) of respondents would continue with their daily routine and let politicians figure things out, indicating that passivity and avoidance are widespread (Figure 6). Encouragingly, almost half of respondents (46%) would participate in the protests peacefully, making sure to avoid a provocation of violence. However, 17% of respondents would participate in the protests and seek to crush the opposition, while 11% of would participate in the protests and be ready to counter the opposition's violence with force if necessary, implying that there is a potentially violent minority. Younger respondents are more ready to use force if necessary; 15% would probably or definitely do this, compared to 9% of people over the age of 35. Men are also more likely to use force than women, with 14% of men and 10% of women reporting that they would probably or definitely do this.

Similarly, youth and men are more likely to seek out to crush the opposition than older people and women. Serb respondents reported the least readiness to use force if necessary (8% would probably or definitely do this), compared to Bosniak or Croat respondents (13% and 14% would probably or definitely do this, respectively). Serb respondents are the least likely to report that they would seek out to crush the opposition (12% would probably or definitely do this), compared to Bosniak and Croat respondents (19% and 23% would probably or definitely do this, respectively).

In a second scenario, respondents were asked about a situation of ethnic tensions. In the scenario, protests were organised by their ethnic group to oppose the construction of a wartime memorial monument of another ethnic group, where one of the protests turned violent. As in the previous scenario, 67% of respondents would avoid the situation and not get involved (Figure 7). Half of respondents (52%) would be active, reporting that they would try to encourage peaceful methods of solving the problem in their community. Willingness to respond with violence was reported by 13%, with no large differences between age groups and genders. Serb respondents reported a lower willingness to respond with violence (8% would probably or definitely do this) compared to Bosniak and Croat respondents (15% and 17%, respectively, would probably or definitely do this).

The items detailed above were used to create indicators of Passive Citizenship, Active Citizenship and Violent Citizenship, as noted in Figure 6 and Figure 7. In line with

Consider a scenario where the parliament is trying to form a stable government, but politicians disagree leading to deadlock. There are citizens' protests in the streets, with some clashes between different groups and with the police. How likely are you to ...

Figure 6: Responses to a hypothetical civic scenario. Labels on the right indicate that the item was incorporated into the indicator for Passive, Active or Violent Citizenship. Items with no label were not incorporated into the indicators as statistical scale construction did not identify them as belonging to just one of these citizenship categories.

Consider a scenario where another ethnic group wants to build a new monument of their wartime history in your community. To oppose the construction of the memorial, people from your ethnic group have organised protests, and at one of the protests there was violence between the two groups. How likely are you to...


Figure 7: Responses to a hypothetical civic scenario. Labels on the right indicate that the item was incorporated into the indicator for Passive, Active or Violent Citizenship. Items with no label were not incorporated into the indicators as statistical scale construction did not identify them as belonging to just one of these citizenship categories.

the aforementioned results, females and people above the age of 35 are more passive (average scores of 6.3, Table 2), while youth and men are more violent (averages of 2.2 and 2.3, respectively, Table 2).

To create a multidimensional assessment, encompassing both behavioural and attitudinal aspects of civic participation, certain civic indicators were combined.

A combined indicator called Active Civic Behaviour was developed by combining Active Citizenship, Civic Engagement, and Willingness to Participate in Civic Initiatives[8]. This indicator encompasses respondents' current engagement levels, their potential to become engaged in causes they support, and their potential for peaceful activism.

Violent Civic Behaviour is a combined measure of Violent Citizenship, Aggression, and the Justification of Violence[9] for political or social change. Justification of Violence captures respondents' tendency to normalise violence as a legitimate means to political ends. Violent Citizenship

measures the potential for violent activism and an individual's likelihood of actually responding in a violent way in various situations, while Aggression encapsulates the psychological aspect of turning to violent citizenship.

It was observed that high levels of Civic Engagement were associated with Violent Citizenship[10]. Further, people with the highest levels of Civic Engagement had the highest levels of both Active and Violent Citizenship[11]. Respondents with high Civic Engagement tended to also have high levels of Violent Civic Behaviour[12], while youth, who displayed higher levels of Active Civic Behaviour and Sense of Civic Responsibility also had higher levels of Violent Civic Behaviour[13]. Respondents who are interested in civic initiatives have higher levels of Violent Civic Behaviour compared to people who are not interested in civic initiatives[14]. Citizens who would use any means including violence to effect change also report higher levels of desirable civic traits[15], particularly Sense of Responsibility[16] and Civic Awareness[17].

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[8] Correlations between components from 0.3 to 0.4. See Indicator Glossary for indicator definitions.

[9] Correlations of components between 0.2 and 0.4.

[10] Correlation of 0.2.

[11] In people over 35, high engagement group scored 5.8 in Active and 2.6 in Violent Citizenship; low engagement group scored 3.4 and 1.7, respectively. In youth, high engagement group scored 5.4 in Active and 3.1 in Violent Citizenship; low engagement group scored 3.7 and 1.9, respectively.

[12] In people over 35, high engagement group scored 2.3 in Violent Civic Behaviour; low engagement group scored 1.5. In youth, high engagement group scored 2.8 in Violent Civic Behaviour; low engagement group scored 1.8

[13] Mean score of 2.2 compared to 1.7 in people over 35.

[14] Score of 2.1 compared to 1.7

[15] Results of ANOVA where respondents were grouped based on what they would do to change current conditions in their community. Groups were "Passive" (do nothing and focus on own affairs), "Active" (use all means except violence) and "Violent" (use any means including violence); see page 22). Statistically significant differences are those which correspond to F > 20 and Cohen's D Effect Size above "medium".

[16] "Violent" group scored 6.1, compared to 5.5 and 4.2 in "Active" and "Passive" groups, respectively.

[17] "Violent" group scored 5.1, compared to 3.8 and 3.0 in "Active" and "Passive" groups, respectively.

Figure 8: Active Civic Behaviour

Figure 9: Violent Civic Behaviour

These findings demonstrate that Active Civic Behaviour is not necessarily devoid of violent means, or for a productive end-goal, and that certain forms of citizens' engagement are at risk of becoming hostile or violent.

The overlap between Active and Violent Civic Behaviour indicators[18] was particularly evident when civic behaviour is measured at the municipality level. Mostar, Stolac and Bužim are among the top nine scoring municipalities in both Active and Violent Civic Behaviour (see Table 3). An overlap is observed among individuals which indicates that the same individuals can be active and violent, but is also observed on the community level – communities contain both people who are active and people who are violent.

1.3 Developing Positive Citizenship

Section 1.2 introduced the overlap between Violent and Active Civic Behaviour. A more positive form of citizenship in BiH therefore must include not only Active Citizenship Behaviour but also an Inclusive Civic Identity, and a Sense of Civic Responsibility, as Active Civic Behaviour in BiH is associated with Violent Civic Behaviour, which indicates that Active Civic Behaviour alone may be violent in nature (see Section 1.2). Together, these indicators which make up a more conclusively positive citizenship capture respondents' likelihood to use non-violent means of change, frequently, with an understanding of the uniting factors that people in Bosnia and Herzegovina share, and a collective feeling of responsibility for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These indicators are described in more detail in the Indicator Glossary. Being a positive citizen in BiH goes beyond being an active citizen, it extends to displaying inclusivity and responsibility. These different aspects of positive citizenship were hypothesised to be driven by a combination of skills and behaviours, assets and contextual factors, and are undermined in the presence of adversities (Figure 10). Figure 11 shows the drivers of Active Civic Behaviour, Inclusive Civic Identity and Sense of Responsibility, revealing how positive citizenship is reinforced or obstructed.

Growth Mindset is important for advancing all aspects of Positive Citizenship (Figure 11).

Active Civic Behaviour and Sense of Responsibility share several drivers. For example, Trust in Local NGOs and Citizens Associations, Civic Awareness and Civic Satisfaction. The former two of these factors become more important in youth, where Trust in Local NGOs also increases Inclusive Civic Identity. Information Consumption drives Active Behaviour and increases people's Sense of Civic Responsibility.

A higher education level enables people to be more active and to feel a stronger Sense of Responsibility, most likely complementing the effects of Civic Awareness and media literacy. Economic Stress has the opposite effect, resulting in less Active Behaviour and a lower Sense of Responsibility. These findings, along with the results presented in Section 1.1, demonstrate the negative influence of a lower sociodemographic status on people's participation.

A lack of Access to Common Spaces (such as community centres, youth centres, MZ councils, civil society organisations) reduces respondents' Active Behaviour.

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[16] "Violent" group scored 6.1, compared to 5.5 and 4.2 in "Active" and "Passive" groups, respectively.

Figure 10: Diagram showing the framework used to investigate which factors develop Positive Citizenship and which undermine it.

Positive Citizenship Outcomes

Drivers	Active Civic Behaviour	Sense of Civic Responsibility	Inclusive Civic Identity
Growth Mindset	**+**	**+**	**+**
Trust in Local NGOs	**+**	**+**	
Civic Awareness	**+**	**+**	
Education Level	**+**	**+**	
Civic Satisfaction	**+**	**+**	
Information Consumption	**+**	**+**	**–**
Critical Media Literacy		**+**	**+**
Intergroup Harmony			**+**
Wartime Perspective Taking	**+**		**+**
Economic Stress	**–**	**–**	
Lack of Access to Civic Spaces	**–**		

Figure 11: Statistically significant drivers of the three Positive Citizenship outcomes that emerged from predictive modelling. Blue cells and positive symbols indicate that the driver positively influences the outcome. Red cells and negative symbols indicate that the factor on the left reduces the citizenship outcome. Larger symbols represent a stronger effect. Grey cells indicate that the driver has no effect on that outcome. Analysis shows that out of the several social, psychological, individual and structural factors that were tested, those shown in Figure 11 have a significant impact on the three positive citizenship outcomes. Model was controlled for age, gender, ethnic group and urbanity. For statistical fit parameters and model results see Appendix. Large symbols correspond to standardised beta weights larger than 0.1; small symbols correspond to beta weights between 0.04 and 0.1.

Respondents facing Economic Stress (low Economic Security, Economic Opportunities, Employment Status and Income Level) also have reduced Active Behaviour.

Social cohesion and reconciliation are more important for the inclusive aspects of Positive Citizenship. Inclusive Civic Identity is driven by Intergroup Harmony (positive relations and perceptions towards other ethnic groups), while Wartime Perspective Taking makes people more inclusive and more active.

The effect of Information Consumption on Positive Citizenship overall is bidirectional, as high levels of Information Consumption undermine an Inclusive Civic Identity. Critical Media Literacy is important in countering this effect, enabling people to have both a higher Inclusive Identity and a stronger Sense of Responsibility. In youth, Critical Media Literacy also increases Active Behaviour, but this effect is not seen in older people, which may indicate that they are prompted to be active by the media they consume, but lack the ability to critically analyse this information and may therefore not be active in a constructive way.

Overall, it was found that Serb respondents have lower Inclusive Civic Identity and Active Civic Behaviour (see Table 2), and Trust in Local NGOs[19]. Youth are on a better path than respondents over the age of 35, with higher Civic Satisfaction, higher Sense of Responsibility for the future of BiH, higher trust and, subsequently, more Active Behaviour. Youth, people with a higher education level, and, to a lesser extent, people in urban areas, have higher levels of the life and civic skills that are required to develop positive citizenship.

In conclusion, we observe that active and responsible citizens emerge in the presence of: a consistent link with media and awareness of civic issues, Trust in Local NGOs[20], Growth Mindset. Structural barriers also exist, namely a low education level, the presence of Economic Stress and a lack of Access to Civic Spaces. Although the latter two of these adversities undermine Active Civic Behaviour, Section 1.4 will investigate the resilience factors associated with overcoming these challenges and remaining active.

Building an Inclusive Civic Identity requires elements which often do not overlap and sometimes even contradict the cornerstones of Active Civic Behaviour and Sense of Civic Responsibility. In this case, Information Consumption leads to polarisation and a breakdown of

[19] Significantly different mean scores; 3.9, 3.4 and 3.0 for Bosniak, Croat and Serb respondents, respectively.

[20] Other institutions were tested but were not determined to be significant drivers

inclusivity, presumably due to the narratives present in the mainstream media (see Section 2.2). Critical Media Literacy is required in order to counter the narratives spread in the media. Resolving Intergroup Tensions, as well as empathetic views about the war, underpin Inclusive Civic Identity.

1.4 Resilient Citizenship: Remaining Active in the Face of Adversities

An absence of civic spaces and the presence of Economic Stress were found to undermine Active Civic Behaviour. However, certain individual traits and contextual factors allow people to remain active, engaged and willing to participate even in the face of these stressors (Figure 12). People who possess these skills are said to be resilient, as they are able to remain active in the face of adversity.

Several of the factors which build resilience to remaining active are also those which were found to be important in developing other aspects of Positive Citizenship. Respondents with a strong Sense of Civic Responsibility

Resilience Factors for remaining **active** even when **civic spaces are limited**

Sense of Civic Responsibility
Civic Awareness
Growth Mindset
Information Consumption
Critical Media Literacy
Education Level
Access to Public Outdoor, Community Sports, Cultural Spaces
Trust in local NGOs and Citizens Associations
Contact Quantity with Outgroups

Resilience Factors for remaining **active** even in the face of **ecomonic stress**

Sense of Civic Responsibility
Civic Awareness
Information Consumption
Growth Mindset
Critical Media Literacy

Figure 12: Resilience factors for remaining active in the face of adversity

are resilient to remaining active despite a lack of Access to Civic Spaces and in cases of Economic Stress. A high level of Civic Awareness – a familiarity with governance, the social and political sphere, and mechanisms of civic

involvement – also appears to pave the way for people to remain active and engaged, even when access to civic spaces is limited and when they face economic difficulties. Information Consumption and Critical Media Literacy are also resilience factors that allow people to remain active in the face of stressors. This may indicate that people who remain informed and aware of developments in civic and political matters, but are also critical of the information they absorb, are more motivated to remain engaged and are more active even if their opportunities to do so are limited. Additionally, people with a Growth Mindset also appear more resilient to a reduction in Active Behaviour in the face of adversities. Although Growth Mindset refers to improvement on a personal level (see Indicator Glossary), this demonstrates that this life skill transcends one's self-development, extending to the change they want to see in their community or BiH as a whole.

Additional resilience factors emerge when we consider a lack of access to civic spaces. A higher education level underlies resilience to being less active when civic spaces are limited. That this resilience factor exists alongside Information Consumption, Critical Media Literacy and Growth Mindset may indicate that these people are able to find additional or alternative methods of participating in civic life or decision making, even when they lack the physical spaces to do so. Access to other Access to other community sports facilities, cultural spaces, public outdoor spaces) appears to compensate for a lack of civic spaces. Further, Trust in Local NGOs is important in allowing people to remain active when civic spaces are limited. Aspects of coexistence – namely Contact Quantity with other ethnic groups, and social group belonging – emerge as resilience factors when civic spaces are limited.

Females and older respondents are at risk of being less active when they do not have sufficient access to civic spaces (Table 2).

Resilience scores can also be calculated for each region or canton of the country (see Figure 13). Trebinje has the lowest resilience score and is therefore the most fragile region when it comes to remaining active in the face of adversities (Figure 13, Figure 14). This may be a result of the low levels of resilience factors – Sense of Civic Responsibility, Civic Awareness, Growth Mindset – in this region. Sarajevo Canton has a high resilience score, indicating that people are more likely to remain active and engaged even in the face of adversity (Figure 13, Figure 14). This can be attributed to the moderate to high scores that Sarajevo Canton respondents have in resilience factors – particularly Critical Media Literacy, Education Level, Sense of Civic Responsibility, Trust in Local NGOs.

Overall, respondents in FBiH are more resilient to remaining active when faced with adversities.

1.5 Key Findings

Seven out of ten respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina report never having participated in online activism, public demonstrations or NGO meetings, and only one in ten report having participated in these activities often. Most respondents are passive, with a slight tendency for peaceful involvement in situations of civic unrest. Compared to people over the age of 35, youth display more Active Civic Behaviour, are more motivated to participate in civic activities and perceive less obstacles to their engagement.

A lack of time is a prevalent obstacle to participation for 53% of respondents, as is a lack of interest in civic initiatives (50%). Respondents are most interested in helping vulnerable people (72%), fighting corruption (68%) and in activities which involve career or financial opportunities (67%). Respondents are critical of the political motives behind civic initiatives (an obstacle for 49% of respondents) and are deterred by activities which are tied to political parties (just 38% are interested in these activities).

Positive Citizenship is strengthened by having Trust in Local NGOs, Civic Satisfaction, and by having a strong awareness of civic mechanisms. Possessing a Growth Mindset is also a foundation for all aspects of Positive Citizenship.

There is a risk of overlap between Active and Violent Civic Behaviour. In ensuring that participation is inclusive, emphasis must be placed on reconciliation – particularly through Intergroup Harmony and Wartime Perspective Taking. Although frequent consumption of media is a prerequisite for active and responsible citizenship, it also undermines Inclusive Civic Identity (see Section 1.3). Therefore, Information Consumption must be coupled with Critical Media Literacy which paves the way for inclusive participation.

People are less active when they lack Access to Civic Spaces, and experience high levels of Economic Stress. To build resilience against these challenges, individuals must cultivate certain civic and life skills – particularly a Sense of Responsibility, Civic Awareness, Growth Mindset, Information Consumption and Critical Media Literacy. These allow citizens to be resilient and remain active when faced with adversity.

Figure 13: Resilience for remaining active in the face of lack of Access to Civic Spaces. Asterisk denotes significant difference between entities. Negative scores indicate that the region is less resilient, performing worse than expected given the challenges faced by respondents. Positive scores indicate that the respondents in this region perform better than expected when faced with challenges. Measurement scale from -10 to +10.

Figure 14: Resilience for remaining active in the face of Economic Stress. Asterisk denotes significant difference between entities. Negative scores indicate that the region is less resilient, performing worse than expected given the challenges faced by respondents. Positive scores indicate that the respondents in this region perform better than expected when faced with challenges. Measurement scale from -10 to +10.

Initiatives to increase civic participation should be tailored to reach those with a lower sociodemographic status. Additionally, Civic Engagement may be increased by making engagement easier and more convenient – for example through online civic engagement. This would resolve the lack of time that prevents participation for many respondents. Interventions to build awareness about governance, socio-political developments and the mechanisms through which citizens can be involved in decision making will increase Positive Citizenship. Transparency of civic initiatives is expected to increase participation. In groups at risk of hostile participation, such as youth or men, attention must be placed on skills training to prevent polarisation due to divisive narratives and to increase harmony between groups.

Highest Scores in Active Civic Behaviour		Highest Scores in Violent Civic Behaviour	
Mostar	5.8	**Buzim**	5.2
Stolac	5.0	**Stolac**	4.7
Sarajevo Stari Grad	4.8	Čapljina	4.0
Maoča	4.8	**Mostar**	3.6
Bužim	4.8	Kalesija	3.4
Tešanj	4.8	Bugojno	3.3
Lukavac	4.8	Lopare	3.1
Tomislavgrad	4.6	Travnik	3.1
Sarajevo Centar	4.4	Gornji Vakuf	2.9

Table 3: Rank of top 9 municipalities by score in Active or Violent Civic Behaviour. Bold text indicates municipality in top rank of both Active and Violent Civic Behaviour.

1.6 Appendix

	18 to 35 years old	Over 35 years old	Male	Female	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Active Civic Behaviour	3.6*	3.3*	3.6*	3.3*	3.5*	3.6*	3.0*
Violent Civic Behaviour	2.2*	1.7*	2.3*	1.5*	2.0*	2.0*	1.6*
Active Citizenship	4.6	4.3	4.6	4.2	4.8*	4.3*	3.7*
Passive Citizenship	5.7*	6.1*	5.7*	6.3*	4.3*	5.8*	5.6*
Violent Citizenship	2.2*	1.8*	2.3*	1.7*	2.2*	2.2*	1.5*
Civic Engagement	2.3	2.1	2.4*	2.1*	2.2	2.5	2.1
Willingness to Participate in Civic Initiatives	4.2*	3.5*	3.9	3.6	3.9*	4.2*	3.3*
Obstacles to Civic Engagement	4.3*	4.8*	4.7	4.5	4.6	4.3	4.8
Sense of Civic Responsibility	5.1*	4.7*	5.0	4.8	5.0	5.0	4.6
Inclusive Civic Identity	6.2	6.3	6.2	6.4	6.7*	6.3*	5.6*
Resilience for Remaining Active in the Face of Lack of Access to Civic Spaces	0.4*	-0.1*	0.3*	-0.1*	0.3*	0.2*	-0.3*
Resilience for Remaining Active in the Face of Economic Stress	0.2	-0.0	0.2	-0.1	0.2*	0.2*	-0.4*

Table 2: Mean scores in civic indicators, disaggregated by age, gender or ethnicity. Asterisks denote statistically significant differences between groups (F>20, Cohen's D larger than "medium").

2. Divisive Narratives and Resilience Against Them

Since the end of the war in 1992-1995 in BiH there has been interest in studying and understanding the various extreme socio-political, interethnic, and historical narratives that have been spreading in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These narratives and ideologies may pose a threat to social cohesion (Belloni, 2018), generate tensions between the ethnic groups of the country, and underpin processes of radicalisation which can result in violent outbursts. They take the form of ethnonationalist narratives (Croat, Bosniak and Serb), as well as Salafi narratives, and hinge on perceptions of history, particularly of the Bosnian War (Becirevic, 2018). In our study, these phenomena are measured by questions that tap into nationalistic ideologies and ethnocentric narratives.

SCORE research is built on an understanding that there are many kinds of extreme divisive narratives circulating in BiH. There narratives include but are not limited to ethnonationalist narratives associated with staunch Bosniak, Croat or Serb far-right nationalist ideologies, and with Salafi ideologies. Following consultations and discussions with various experts in BiH, SCORE attempts to measure these four phenomena, and to investigate what factors reinforce or mitigate the support for these narratives with the hope of shedding light on policies or programmes that could be more effective in reducing the sway of extreme narratives. In the context of this study, extreme divisive attitudes are studied to understand if and to what extent adoption of such narratives lead to a tendency towards violent activism or inter-ethnic tensions, and if those effects can be mitigated by other psychosocial, economic or attitudinal factors.

Therefore, one of the main areas of interest of SCORE BiH 2020 was an investigation of the prevalence and impact of these narratives, aiming to answer the following questions:

1. What is the level of support for such narratives and ideologies (Section 2.1)?

2. What are the main sources of such narratives, and are they effective at convincing citizens (Section 2.2)?

3. What factors lead to the adoption of such narratives and ideologies (Section 2.3)?

4. Do these narratives and ideologies lead to interethnic tensions and violent civic activism, or are they benign (Section 2.3)?

5. How can we build individual resilience against these pathways and halt the mechanisms leading towards violent citizenship (Section 2.4)?

Following consultations with practitioners and researchers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, SCORE BiH conceptualised a pathway that a citizen may follow towards adopting extreme divisive attitudes, shown in Figure 15 (Borum, 2012; McCauley, 2008). This process begins with an individual's exposure to stressors and adversities, which in turn can lead to adoption of ethnonationalist or Salafi ideologies and narratives, and culminates in the expression of such ideologies in the form of Tension with Outgroups, violent civic behaviours, and disengagement from Active Civic Behaviour. Not all individuals, of course, proceed down this pathway: some are not exposed to the stressors which can lead to adoption of extreme ideologies, while others are indeed exposed to stressors but are resilient, possessing characteristics which allow them to avoid becoming radicalised in the face of potentially radicalising stressors. The radicalisation process can be interrupted if an individual possesses key resilience factors, which may be individual factors such as skills or mental health; contextual and social factors such as healthy family and

Figure 15: A diagram of the process used to investigate the driving factors and possible outcomes of divisive ideologies. This is a simplified conceptual diagram which omits factors which may halt or mitigate this process, which will be presented, investigated and discussed later on.

communal relations; access to services or facilities; attitudes or strong feelings of identity (see Section 2.4). The process can be interrupted at any stage, and different resilience factors may be relevant at different stages. Using the statistical analyses presented in the following sections, we will reveal which stressors reinforce the pathways to ethnonationalism and Salafism, and how these pathways can be interrupted by building specific resilience factors.

2.1 Level of Support for Ethnonationalist and Salafi Narratives

Levels of support for potentially radicalising narratives were measured using indicators which probe particular aspects of narratives associated with Bosniak, Serb, and Croat ethnonationalism, as well as Salafi ideology. These narratives were identified during consultations with local experts, focus groups and desk research (Puhalo, 2018; Turčilo, 2018), and are built upon an understanding that there are many forms of competing extremisms in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Becirevic, 2018). The percent of respondents which agree with each is shown in Table 4. Each block of questions was asked only to the relevant ethnic group, therefore percentages give level of support within the ethnic group.

Bosniak Nationalist Narratives	Bosniaks did not commit any war crimes.	**40%**
	We are the majority in this land, the other groups should realise that and let us run this country.	**41%**
	If we do not ensure that Bosniaks dominate in this land, then history of oppression and genocide will repeat itself.	**46%**
	Naser Orić is one of my heroes.	**54%**
	Bosniaks are the true victims of the wars in the Balkans.	**85%**
Croat Nationalist Narratives	Ustaša movement is a legitimate political movement for the defence of Croats in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.	**46%**
	Those in the Šestorka (Prlić, Stojić, Praljak and others) are some of my heroes.	**52%**
	War crimes that the Croat Šestorka (Prlić, Stojić, Praljak and others) are accused of committing never happened.	**57%**
	Croats deserve for Herzeg-Bosnia to be reinstated.	**71%**
	Croats are the true victims of the wars in the Balkans.	**75%**
Serb Nationalist Narratives	The Četnik movement is a legitimate political movement for the defence of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.	**38%**
	Mladić is one of my heroes.	**57%**
	Genocide that some Serbs are accused of committing never happened.	**68%**
	Serbs are the true victims of the wars in the Balkans.	**78%**
	The international tribunals set up after the war unfairly focussed on Serbs and not on other ethnic groups.	**81%**
Salafi Narratives	Sometimes we must declare that someone is a non-believer (kafir) and remove them from our community	**13%**
	The terrible things that happened to Bosnian Muslims during the war was divine punishment for the impurity of our religion and our sins.	**15%**
	The para-jamaats who decided to join the Islamic Community made a mistake.	**18%**
	The Islamic Community is not representing the correct form of Islam.	**19%**
	Non-believers should suffer the consequences.	**21%**
	Most Muslims in this country have strayed away from true Islam.	**34%**

Table 4: Percent of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with nationalist or Salafi narratives. Only respondents who identify as part of the relevant ethnic or religious group were asked about the respective narratives.

Overall, results show that there is moderate to strong support for ethnonationalist narratives in all ethnic groups, with most narratives achieving support from over half of the respondents. Some narratives are not as strongly supported, such as perceiving Četniks or Ustaša as legitimate, or believing that Bosniaks committed no war crimes whatsoever. Support for Salafi narratives among Muslim Bosniaks is much lower than their support for nationalist narratives, with none of the probed narratives achieving a majority of support.

Figure 16 shows the average scores that each ethnic group achieved in each region of the country in the indicators measuring support for various narratives. Among Bosniaks, we find that support for nationalist narratives is highest in Una-Sana Canton and Canton 10, and lower in Prijedor, Banja Luka and Doboj regions. Among Croats, nationalist narratives have the highest support in Canton 10, West Herzegovina Canton, and Herzegovina-Neretva Canton but support is low in Croats who live in the RS. Serb nationalist narratives find highest support in Serbs living in Zenica-Doboj Canton and Sarajevo Canton, while they find lowest support among Serbs living in Brčko District[21].

Figure 16: Heatmaps of support for various Ethnonationalist and Salafi narratives. Scores are shown only for the relevant ethno-religious group. In areas where the sample of that particular ethno-religious group is too small, scores are not shown. These indicators are composed of a combination of levels of support for each of the individual questions that make them up, and have strong statistical validity (Cronbach's alpha of 0.79 to 0.89)

[21] Heatmaps giving scores of these indicators can also be found at www.scoreforpeace.org/en/bosnia.

2.2 Sources of Narratives: Their Extent and Their Efficacy

Respondents were asked about the frequency that they are exposed to the narratives above. Results reveal that the most common sources of ethnonationalist and Salafi narratives are politicians and television (see Table 5). Four in ten respondents say that they hear ethnonationalist narratives from politicians and TV at least once a week. However, the sources which were found to be most prevalent were not significantly generating higher levels of support for those narratives. Instead, it was exposure to narratives in more intimate and personal social contexts (family, friends, religious spaces, schools, the workplace, museums and cultural sites) which were statistically significantly associated with higher levels of support for ethnonationalist or Salafi narratives (see highlighted cells in Table 5). The most effective sources among them were family, and museums, cultural sites or events.

Therefore, although targeting media and reducing the propagation and normalisation of such narratives is a priority, a more important aspect is combating the spread of such narratives through informal sources and in citizens' social life. Furthermore, although limiting the spread of such narratives from museums and cultural sites may be feasible, limiting the informal spread of narratives in daily social settings may present a challenge. Therefore, focus should be given

to building resilience of citizens against adopting such ideologies when confronted with them in their immediate social circle (as discussed in Section 2.4).

2.3 Drivers and Outcomes of Ethnonationalist Ideology and Support for Salafi Narratives

Using predictive modelling, we can verify the process shown in Figure 15 and test which economic, social, interpersonal or psychological factors lead to higher levels of support for ethnonationalist or Salafi ideologies, and whether these ideologies have an association with citizens' civic behaviour (Nasser-Eddine, et al., 2010; Allan, 2015). In these models, a composite indicator named Ethnonationalist Ideology was used, which is composed not only of the indicator Support for Ethnonationalist Narratives, but also of the two indicators which measured the reluctance for multi-ethnic Coexistence and a political aspiration to Ethnonationalism, which were added to achieve a deeper and more reliable measurement of Ethnonationalist Ideology[23]. Therefore, the composite indicator Ethnonationalist Ideology captures not only support for the key nationalist narratives but also a rejection of multi-ethnic society, and a desire to secure an ethnically uniform territory for one's ingroup.

Figure 17 and Figure 18 below show the results of the statistical modelling process for ethnonationalism and Salafism indicators respectively. The strength of the

Source of narratives	Ethnonationalist narratives	Salafi narratives
Politicians	41%	27%
TV	40%	29%
Online media sites	29%	23%
Social Media	29%	24%
Newspaper	27%	20%
People at school, university or work	10%	9%
Friends	9%	9%
Family	9%	10%
Mosque or Church	6%	10%
Museums, monuments, cultural sites or events	5%	5%

Table 5: Percentage of respondents which reported that they are exposed to ethnonationalist or Salafi narratives at least once a week from each source, in the last six months. Highlighted cells denote that exposure from that particular source is statistically associated with a higher level of support for such narratives[22]. Note that the most prevalent sources of narratives are not the most effective in convincing individuals to support those narratives.

[22] Exposure in each of these highlighted contexts was found to be statistically significantly correlated with higher levels of support, at the 0.01 level.
[23] Ethnonationalist Ideology was a latent construct composed of three components, with loadings of 0.5, -0.5 and 0.6 for Support for Narratives, Coexistence and Ethnonationalism respectively. The Cronbach's alpha of the components ranged from 0.7 to 0.9.

pathway is represented by the thickness of the arrow, with blue arrows representing positive relationships, red arrows representing negative relationships, and grey dashed lines representing relationships with no significant impact. Among the drivers tested, four indicators stood out as significantly leading to higher levels of support for Ethnonationalist Ideology:

1. Exposure to Nationalist Narratives in informal or personal contexts (at school, work, museums, from friends and family) is the strongest predictor of support for Ethnonationalist Ideology, and remains the most important driver in all demographic groups – because reducing the propagation of such narratives from informal contexts is difficult, strategies could focus instead on building up resilience against adoption of such narratives, even if an individual is exposed to them constantly (see Section 2.4).

2. Economic Stress, which is a composite indicator measuring an individual's exposure to economic turmoil, precarious employment, and unstable income, is the second strongest driver. This implies that the less economically stable tend to develop higher support for Ethnonationalist Ideologies, because they are under more strain, more fragile, or feel under threat and economically marginalised. Socioeconomic grievances, therefore, underpin and facilitate the radicalisation process.

3. Information Consumption, an indicator measuring frequency with which a citizens follows the news from traditional and online media also spurs Ethnonationalist Ideology regardless of its content. The media in BiH therefore has a polarising effect, with those who watch more news developing higher support for narratives and rejecting coexistence.

4. Exposure to Interethnic Conflict, both past and present, leads to increased support for Ethnonationalist Ideology, but of the four key drivers this is the weakest. Those who have witnessed or experienced interethnic conflict are more likely to turn away from ethnic cooperation and to adhere more strongly to ethnocentric narratives.

The impact of Economic Stress on Ethnonationalist Ideology is stronger in the FBiH rather than the RS, while the impact of Information Consumption and Exposure to Interethnic Conflict is stronger in the RS. The stronger impact of Information Consumption generating Ethnonationalist Identity in the RS could be explained by the other reports highlighting the proliferation of online media sources as hubs of disinformation in the RS (Cvjetićanin, 2019). The varying strengths of drivers across the entities necessitates the slight differentiation of strategies to mitigate the adoption of ethnonationalism in each entity. All four drivers were found to have similar effects regardless of age group.

The right-hand side half of Figure 17 also shows the impact that Ethnonationalist Ideology has on three key outcomes for social cohesion. Statistical modelling has shown that indeed adoption of an Ethnonationalist Ideology leads to a higher propensity for aggression and political violence, as well as negative feelings and discrimination of other ethnic groups. These results show that support for such narratives must be reduced if social disruption is to be avoided. Another effect of adopting Ethnonationalist Ideology is a lower level of Active Civic Behaviour, indicating that ethnonationalists tend to disengage from peaceful activism and civic participation, and slide either towards apathy, or towards more violent and divisive forms of political expression.

Figure 18 shows results for the drivers and outcomes of Support for Salafi Narratives comparable to the results

Figure 17: Results of the predictive model which reveal the drivers and outcomes of Ethnonationalist Ideology. Numbers beside each arrow are the standardised beta weights, which give strength of that predictive pathway. Model was controlled for age, gender, ethnic group and urbanity. For statistical fit parameters and model results see Appendix.

for Ethnonationalist Ideology. We see that unlike Ethnonationalist Ideology, which is driven primarily by Exposure to Nationalist Narratives, Support for Salafi Narratives is equally driven by the three factors. Note that Exposure to Salafi Narratives has a weaker impact on generating support for Salafism compared to the effect of Exposure to Ethnonationalist Narratives on generating Ethnonationalist Ideology. Information Consumption (the extent to which an individual follows the media) has no effect on Salafism possibly because such narratives are less common on mainstream channels. As with ethnonationalism, supporting Salafi narratives does lead to higher interethnic tension and a tendency towards violence, but the effect is not as strong compared to ethnonationalism. This fits in with results from qualitative studies which also find that there is a lower threat of violent radicalisation from Salafi groups compared to nationalist groups (Becirevic, 2018).

Several other drivers were also tested but did not have a significant impact on generating higher levels of ethnonationalism or Salafism. These included levels of Life Satisfaction, Civic Satisfaction, Group Grievance and Marginalisation, low levels of Personal Security and low Trust in All Institutions. Although these might be radicalising factors for some individuals, across the country and across demographic groups they do not have a statistically significant overall pattern of contributing to radicalisation.

2.4 Resilience Against Ethnonationalist Ideology and

Violent Citizenship

Resilience analysis can identify the characteristics of individuals that display an unexpected positive profile, with positive results on outcome indicators despite their extreme level of exposure to challenges and adversities. These resilient individuals are those that do remarkably well despite challenges which we would otherwise expect to disrupt those key outcomes. Resilience analysis can also identify characteristics of individuals who are fragile, and who display negative outcomes despite facing relatively few adversities. Resilience has been studied in developmental psychology (Luthar, Cicchetti, & Becker, 2000; Masten, 2011; Masten, 2014; Masten, 2015; Masten & Cicchetti, in press) as well as in conflict studies (Lordos, 2020) and PVE (Becirevic, 2018; Turcalo & Velijan, 2018). In the context of the process outlined in Figure 15 and the results of modelling shown in Figure 17, resilience analysis can answer two key questions related to halting the process at two crucial junctures:

1. Firstly, what factors should be encouraged to build resilience of people who are exposed to stressors (Economic Stress, Exposure to Narratives, etc.), thereby interrupting those predictive pathways and preventing the adoption of Ethnonationalist Ideology?

2. And secondly, for individuals that have already adopted Ethnonationalist Ideology, what resilience factors prevent those ideologies and narratives from manifesting into Violent Civic Behaviour?

Resilience analysis will, therefore, reveal what other personal, economic, social, contextual and attitudinal

**Figure 18:** Results of the predictive model which reveal the drivers and outcomes of Support for Salafi Narratives. Numbers beside each arrow give the strength of that predictive pathway. This model was run on a subsample of 1452 Bosniak Muslims, excluding other ethnic and religious groups. Model was controlled for age, gender and urbanity. For model results statistical fit parameters see Appendix.

Figure 19: Model of factors leading to Ethnonationalist Ideology and Violent Civic Behaviour, with possible pathways that can be interrupted at two stages, shown as two yellow dashed lines. Interrupting the process at stage one (left) requires building resilience against stressors that are known to generate support for Ethnonationalist Ideology. Interrupting the process at stage two (right) requires building resilience against manifesting Violent Civic Behaviour even among supporters of Ethnonationalist Ideologies.

factors build resilience and interrupt the radicalisation process at two distinct stages (shown in Figure 19 as yellow dashed lines). Because the impact of Ethnonationalist Ideology on generating Violent Civic Behaviour is much larger than the impact of Support for Salafi Narratives on Violent Civic Behaviour, resilience analysis will focus on ethnonationalism, as the main ideological pathway against which resilience needs to be encouraged.

Some citizens of BiH will inevitably be exposed to Economic Stress (unemployment, low income), nationalist narratives both in their personal life and through the media (Information Consumption), and to Interethnic Strife both past and present. In some cases, reducing or eliminating these adversities is not feasible, and so building resilience against them becomes crucial. Table 6 shows the resilience factors associated with individuals who reject Ethnonationalist Ideology despite having higher exposure to the four adversities, as well as fragility factors of those who have adopted Ethnonationalist Ideology despite relatively low adversities.

Resilience is strongly associated with cohesive attitudes such as an Inclusive Civic Identity, Social Tolerance and Tolerant Religiosity. Note that intensity of Religiosity was found to be a fragility factor, indicating that religious citizens are more fragile to adopting ethnonationalist narratives (see below). The recognition of overarching and universal values common among all faiths makes a person resilient.

Resilient individuals tend to hold dear a particular set of identities. Although many ethnic and religious identities were checked as possible resilience factors, the only identities which were found to be associated with higher resilience were inclusive, non-ethnic and non-religious identities such as a strength of Regional or City identity

identity, and an identity centred on citizenship of BiH. Resilience can be built by encouraging the development of civic pride and local identities which transcend ethnic or religious boundaries.

Contact with other ethnic groups is another characteristic of resilient individuals, justifying that healthy and frequent inter-ethnic interaction should be facilitated. In areas where encouraging contact is not feasible, building forgiving and empathetic perceptions of the war, such as being able to take the perspective of other ethnic groups and recognising responsibility for the conflict are also strong mitigators of ethnonationalism in the face of adversities. These findings motivate a strong intergroup healing component of resilience-building strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Resilient individuals also embody skills such as Negotiation, Cooperation, Growth Mindset and Critical Media Literacy, and have higher Mental Wellbeing. This implies that building on social skills will help more fragile citizens bolster themselves against ethnonationalism and violent citizenship. Other resilience factors include a strong sense of Social Connectedness, particularly with one's family, and access to common spaces for sport or outdoor recreation.

Fragility factors are associated with a lower resilience. That is, they characterise individuals who develop ethnonationalist tendencies even if they are not experiencing a particularly high level of exposure to adversities. Strong fragility factors were Religiosity (in contrast to Tolerant Religiosity as a resilience factor), Cultural Distance and Callousness. Mitigating cultural distance and reinforcing the cultural commonalities and shared heritage of all Bosnians will lead to individuals who are more resilient and less fragile to ethnonationalism, since it is easy to reject such narratives when there is a strong understanding of the

historical and cultural similarities of the ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For Muslims, Support for Salafi Narratives is also a fragility factor, implying that Ethnonationalist Ideology and Salafi ideology reinforce each other in some cases.

Table 7 shows the factors associated with resilience against developing Violent Civic Behaviour in the

Resilience Factors

Attitudes	Inclusive Civic Identity
	Tolerant Religiosity
	Social Tolerance
	Contact Quantity with Outgroups
	Responsibility for Conflict
	Wartime Perspective Taking
	Respect for Human Rights
Media	Critical Media Literacy
	Trust in Media: Al Jazeera Balkans
Life Skills	Negotiation
	Cooperation
	Growth Mindset
	Mental Wellbeing
	Political Security
	Social Connectedness: Family
Identity	Strength of Identity: Citizen of BiH
	Strength of Identity: City
	Strength of Identity: Regional
	Strength of Identity: Bosnian
	Strength of Identity: European
	Access to Common Spaces: Outdoor, Community, Sport, Cultural

Fragility Factors

Cultural Distance to Outgroups
Religiosity
Support for Salafi Narratives
Callousness

Table 6: Factors associated with resilience against developing Ethnonationalist Ideology in the face of the four adversities.

Resilience Factors

	Passive Citizenship
•	Tolerant Religiosity
	Social Connectedness
•	Political Security
•	Cooperation
•	Negotiation
	Gratitude
	Access to Common Spaces: Religious
•	Mental Wellbeing

Fragility Factors

	Sense of Civic Responsibility
	Cultural Distance Towards Ingroup
•	Callousness
	Being Male
	Being Young

Table 7: Factors associated with resilience against manifesting Violent Civic Behaviour despite support for Ethnonationalist Ideology. Yellow pellets signify factors which contribute to resilience at both stages of the process.

face of Ethnonationalist Ideology. They therefore typify individuals who adopt a more nationalistic stance, but do not condone violent political activism. These factors therefore mitigate against the final stages of radicalisation.

The strongest resilience factor is Passive Citizenship, implying that encouraging Active Citizenship in individuals who are ethnonationalistic may lead to a greater readiness for violence. Passivity and avoidance of civic engagement is what holds some ethnonationalists back from becoming violent. On the other hand, feeling a strong Sense of Civic Responsibility - that is, feeling that one is dutybound to make sacrifices for the common good – is actually a fragility factor, and pushes ethnonationalists towards violent expression of their political beliefs. These results are not surprising; they reveal that the logical conclusion of Ethnonationalist Ideology is not a passive turn away from civic life, but towards radical activism in order to realise nationalist goals.

Factors which were earlier found to be resilience factors against developing ethnonationalism also appear as

resilience factors here: skills such as Cooperation, Negotiation, and Gratitude. Social Connectedness is important, as well as Mental Wellbeing. This means that those who are resilient to this stage of the radicalisation process are psychosocially well-adapted, and so supporting such individuals to build their social skills and resolve mental health issues is crucial.

Political Security, an indicator which measures how safe someone feels to air their political opinions in public, is a resilience factor for both stages of the radicalisation process. This implies that individuals who feel that their political ideals are marginalised and their concerns ignored tend to be more fragile. In the case of violent ethnonationalists, it is indeed a good thing that such ideas are marginalised or at least rejected by the mainstream public. However, this result shows that when such groups feel that their concerns are not addressed, they become more prone to radicalising pathways.

Notably, although common spaces for sport and recreation were important resilience factors against ethnonationalism, in the case of manifesting violence we see access to religious spaces as more crucial. Tolerant Religiosity also reappears as a resilience factor, motivating a religious component of any resilience strategy.

Whereas Cultural Distance towards outgroups was a fragility factor for ethnonationalism (which motivates interventions that bring together different ethnic groups) in Table 7 we see that those who are fragile to becoming violent feel more Cultural Distance towards their own ethnic ingroup. This means that ethnonationalists are more fragile to violent radicalisation when they feel dissimilar and disconnected from other members of their own ethnic group. This strongly motivates interventions which bring individuals who support Ethnonationalist Ideology closer to their own community and ethnic group, as more mainstream members of the same ethnic group could serve as a damping factor of the ethnonationalism radicalisation process.

Two demographic factors appear to characterise individuals more prone to developing Violent Civic Behaviour and can be used to focus interventions: being younger and being male[24]. Therefore, for this stage of the radicalisation process, resilience interventions should give attention to young men, who are particularly fragile.

A resilience score for the two stages of the process

Figure 20: Scores of resilience for the two stages of radicalisation across Bosnia and Herzegovina. The figure on top displays the resilience scores against developing an Ethnonationalist Ideology. The figure at the bottom displays the resilience scores against developing Violent Civic Behaviour. Positive scores signify resilience while negative scores signify fragility. Measurement scale from -10 to +10.

can also be calculated per region, and is shown as a heatmap in Figure 20. Areas with positive scores are doing better than expected, and therefore are said to be resilient, despite the challenges they face, while areas with negative scores are struggling under comparatively fewer stressors. Some areas are very resilient, like Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Goražde and Istočno Sarajevo

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[24] Fragile individuals with resilience score less than -0.5 are on average 4.5 years younger than resilience citizens (those with resilience scores above 0.5). Also, 60% of fragile individuals are men, while only 37% of resilience individuals are men.

– Pale, with positive scores in both heatmaps, or very fragile like Central Bosnia Canton. Other cantons have a specific profile of resilience and fragility. For example, Bijeljina and West Herzegovina Canton are both very fragile in the earlier stages of radicalisation: despite experiencing low levels of ethnonationalism-generating adversities, they have a higher than expected level of ethnonationalism. However, the same regions are not particularly prone to translating ethnonationalism into Violent Citizenship. Therefore, the first group of resilience factors should be targeted in those two areas.

2.5 Key Findings

The survey sought to understand the nature of radicalising narratives in Bosnia and Herzegovina - the three forms of radical ethnonationalism as well as extreme Salafism.

1. Overall, support for ethnonationalism is high, with most respondents giving some level of support to such narratives and a minority expressing strong opposition. Support for Salafist narratives among Bosniaks is much lower.

2. Exposure to Narratives in personal spaces and intimate social settings seems to be more effective in generating Support for Ethnonationalist Narratives than Exposure to Narratives in public and formal channels such as TV or newspapers, even though exposure is more common in public and formal channels.

3. The key drivers which lead to higher levels of Ethnonationalist Ideology are Economic Stress, Exposure to Interethnic Conflict, Information Consumption and, most of all Exposure to Ethnonationalist Narratives.

4. Ethnonationalist Ideology is not only more prevalent than Salafism, but it also has a much stronger link to higher levels of Violent Civic Behaviour and Intergroup Tension, justifying the importance of investigating factors that make people resilient against nationalistic radicalisation.

5. Resilience against the adoption of Ethnonationalist Ideology in the face of stressors is associated with: a strong Inclusive Civic and Regional Identity, frequent Contact with other ethnic groups, tolerant and ecumenical views on faith, psychosocial wellbeing and healthy relationships, balanced and empathetic views of the conflict.

6. Resilience against manifestation of Violent Civic Behaviour among supporters of Ethnonationalist Ideology is associated with Tolerant Religiosity and access to places of worship, psychosocial wellbeing and civic passivity. Fragility is associated with a feeling of cultural estrangement from one's own ethnic group. Young men are particularly fragile.

2.6   Appendix

	18 to 35 years old	Over 35 years old	Male	Female	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Ethnonationalist Ideology	4.5	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.6
Exposure to Ethnonationalist Narratives in Personal Life	3.3	3.0	3.3	3.1	3.6*	2.9*	2.5*
Exposure to Interethnic Conflict	0.8*	1.4*	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.0
Tension with Outgroups	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.5*	3.8*	4.2*
Economic Stress	4.7*	5.6*	4.9*	5.6*	5.3	5.3	5.1
Information Consumption	6.3*	5.7*	6.1	5.8	5.9	6.0	6.1
Active Civic Behaviour	3.6*	3.3*	3.6*	3.3*	3.5*	3.6*	3.0*
Violent Civic Behaviour	2.2*	1.7*	2.3*	1.5*	2.0*	2.0*	1.6*
Resilience against Ethnonationalist Ideology	-0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2*	-0.2*	-0.2*
Resilience against Violent Civic Behaviour	-0.4*	0.4*	-0.2*	0.1*	-0.1	-0.1	0.2
Support for Salafi Narratives	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	-	-
Exposure to Salafi Narratives in Personal Life	3.8*	3.5*	3.6	3.6	3.6	-	-

Table 8: Mean scores in indicators relevant to ethnonationalism and divisive narratives disaggregated by age, gender or ethnicity. Asterisks denote statistically significant differences between groups (F>20, Cohen's d larger than "medium").

3. Intersections of Civic Behaviours and Ideologies

3.1 Grouping Citizens on Ethnonationalist Ideology and Active Civic Behaviour

Chapters 1 and 2 presented findings on Active Citizenship and Ethnonationalism. This chapter investigates the interplay between nationalism and different types of civic behaviour. Previous chapters have already shown that Active Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina can often be violent or ethnonationalist. In this chapter, we group respondents into five citizenship types, depending on their levels of Ethnonationalist Ideology and Active Civic Behaviour. This grouping can isolate and separate active citizens who are nationalistic from active citizens who are not, and then compare the various groups with each other. It is worth stressing that the grouping algorithm does not distinguish between ethnic groups, which means that it can group Bosniak, Serb and Croat ethnonationalists together and find their common characteristics.

	Active Anti-Ethnonationalists	Passive Anti-Ethnonationalists	Passive Ethnonationalists	Active Ethnonationalists	Mainstream
Active Civic Behaviour	5.5	1.4	1.6	5.2	3.4
Ethnonationalist Ideology	3.1	3.2	5.7	5.9	4.5

Table 9: The five groups and their average scores in Active Civic Behaviour and Ethnonationalist Ideology. Scores that are significantly higher than the mainstream are highlighted in orange, while scores that are significantly lower are in grey.

Each of the five groups has a distinct profile of characteristics. Revealing each group's profile helps us understand citizens' desires, anxieties, and future visions, as well as the challenges and obstacles they face. Satisfying each group's needs and resolving their tensions paves the way to constructive, peaceful and active citizenship, which will contribute to social cohesion and reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We chose to isolate five groups depending on their scores on Ethnonationalist Ideology and Active Civic Behaviour[25], shown in Table 9. These were:

1. A group of "Active Anti-Ethnonationalists" which made up 15.3% of respondents. Members of this group scored high on Active Civic Behaviour but low on Ethnonationalist Ideology. These are positive changemakers who have high Civic Engagement and reject ethnonationalist narratives.

2. 14.7% of respondents fell into a group which scored low on both Active Civic Behaviour and on Ethnonationalist Ideology. These "Passive Anti-Ethnonationalists" support coexistence and reject Ethnonationalist Ideology but are passive and not very interested in community involvement.

3. Another passive group was found, which scored low on Active Civic Behaviour but high on Ethnonationalist Ideology. These are the "Passive Ethnonationalists": disengaged citizens who harbour ethnonationalistic attitudes and make up 15.6% of citizens.

4. A group of "Active Ethnonationalists" who scored high in both indicators make up 14.5% of respondents. They are civically engaged but also strongly convinced of ethnonationalist narratives and tend to reject ethnic coexistence.

5. Finally, the largest group of 39.9%, representing the "Mainstream" who achieved scores in both Active Civic Behaviour and Ethnonationalist Ideology which are close to the average.

Once these groups have been established, we may compare their scores on other key indicators to determine if there are statistically significant differences, allowing us to give granularity to each group's profile. Discussion of the profiles of the groups follows, detailed scores of each group for each indicator are shown in Section 3.4, while a simplified profile of each group is shown in Table 10.

Active Anti-Ethnonationalists are younger, more progressive, support multi-ethnic cooperation more and have a very positive civic profile: compared to the other groups they have higher scores in Civic Awareness, Inclusive Civic Identity, Tolerant Religiosity and Civic Responsibility. Interestingly, the Active Ethnonationalist group has equally high Civic Awareness and higher Information Consumption (as we have seen consuming media can be a driver of ethnonationalism) and moderate levels of Sense of Civic Responsibility.

[25] Individuals were assigned membership to one of the five groups based on the following logic: if an individual is less than 1 standard deviation away from the average score of the indicators Active Civic Behaviour and Ethnonationalist Ideology (3.4, 4.5), that individual is sorted into the "Mainstream" group. Otherwise, they are sorted into one of the other four groups depending on if they are above or below the average of each of the two indicators.

Active Anti-Ethnonationalists - 15.3%
"Active citizens but not totally benign"

- High Sense of Civic Responsibility and Civic Awareness
- Resilient against ethnonationalism but not against violent citizenship
- Intermediate levels of Violent Civic Behaviour
- Support multi-ethnic politics and integration of RS- FBiH, and EU entry
- Resilient to challenges which obstruct civic engagement, can remain active citizens
- Tend to be younger, more urban
- Tolerant, progressive (gender, multi-ethnic)

Active Ethnonationalists - 14.5%
"Fertile ground for recruitment"

- Violent Civic Behaviour, Aggression
- Fragile: develop Ethnonationalist Ideology & Violent Civic Behaviour easily
- Highest Trust in Political Parties and Religiosity
- Highest Information Consumption
- Highest Exposure to Interethnic Conflict
- Disagree with RS - FBiH integration
- Tend to be younger, more rural
- Higher tension with other groups, feel very threatened by other groups
- More tolerant of extremist groups

Passive Anti-Ethnonationalists - 14.7%
"Progressive, but disengaged"

- Low levels of Violent Civic Behaviour
- Cooperative, empathetic, low Aggression Mistrust political parties and NGOs
- Lowest Civic Responsibility, and Information Consumption
- Harmonious with all ethnic groups
- High Support for separation of church-state, gender equality, multi-ethnic politics
- Resilient against Ethnonationalist Ideology
- Highest mental well-being

Passive Ethnonationalists - 15.6%
"Disengaged and under strain"

- Low levels of Violent Civic Behaviour
- High levels of Economic Stress
- Disagree with RS - FBiH integration
- Low Civic Responsibility & Awareness
- Lowest Intergroup Contact, Social Tolerance, Inclusive Civic Identity
- More resilient to ethnonationalism manifesting into violence

Mainstream - 39.9%
"The middle-of-the-road plurality"

- Average scores on most attitudinal, political and social indicators
- Neither tense nor harmonious with other groups
- Tend to perceive less Exposure to Nationalist Narratives in the Media

- Higher Trust in Government Institutions
- Less strongly held regional identity, lower European identity
- Lower Support for Inclusive Educational Reforms

Table 10: Profiles of the five groups summarising some of the characteristics of each groups and significant differences on key indicators.

This shows that Active Ethnonationalists do possess some positive civic traits, but their civic involvement manifests in a hostile, violent and nationalistic manner; Active Ethnonationalists have higher Violent Citizenship Behaviour, Islamophobia, and lower Tolerant Religiosity. They also have a higher Trust in Own Political Party, implying they are content with the current political order.

Although Violent Citizenship is significantly higher in Active Ethnonationalists, it is also present at moderate levels in Active Anti-Ethnonationalists. Violent Citizenship is often associated with Active Citizenship, so the Active Anti-Ethnonationalist group require support in order to channel their civic enthusiasm towards non-violent forms of activism. Furthermore, Active Anti-Ethnonationalists tend to be fragile towards developing Violent Civic Behaviour, as they have a lower resilience score for that pathway compared to other groups. For

all these reasons, the most active and enthusiastic segment of Bosnian society needs to be encouraged to participate while also building up key resilience factors, so as not to channel their civic engagement towards less cohesive or polarising aims.

The largest group are the Mainstream group, which have average scores of both Ethnonationalist Ideology and Active Civic Behaviour. In almost all other indicators they also have scores which are half-way between the extremes exemplified by the other groups. The quality of their relations with ethnic outgroups are mediocre, neither tense nor fully harmonious, and they are lukewarm about various political visions about the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, they do show some interesting differences compared to other groups: they tend to stick to their particular ethnic identities and have weaker regional or European identities identities

(which were found to be resilience factors against ethnonationalism). They perceive a lower exposure to ethnonationalist narratives in the media, but this is not due to less frequent consumption of media and therefore may be due to a normalisation of nationalism and desensitisation to such narratives by the mainstream.

The Passive Anti-Ethnonationalist group exhibits mixed characteristics. On one hand they are inclusive, tolerant, and socially connected, but on the other they have the lowest levels of Sense of Responsibility, and they tend to be the most passive group. Passive Anti-Ethnonationalists also have lower Trust in NGOs and in Political Parties, demonstrating that even though they may be harmonious, they feel disillusioned with the institutional channels through which Civic Engagement is usually conducted.

Both passive groups also tend to be older than the two active groups by approximately 6 years. Men tend to be in the two active groups more than women, particularly the Active Ethnonationalists. Although the mainstream group is largest, among urbanites the next largest group is the Active Anti-Ethnonationalists followed by Passive Anti-Ethnonationalists (21 and 16% respectively) while among rural respondents Passive Ethnonationalists are the largest group followed by Active Ethnonationalists (18 and 16%). Higher levels of income are associated with the two active groups, while lower income groups tend to be more passive.

In terms of individual traits and life skills, Active Ethnonationalists tend to be more aggressive and callous. They are also more religious and have a lower city-based identity, while the Anti-Ethnonationalist groups are the opposite (note that city-based identity was a resilience factor for ethnonationalism). Passive Ethnonationalists also display a striking negative pattern of individual traits: lowest Critical Media Litewracy, lower skills such as Growth Mindset[26], Cooperation and Negotiation. They are facing socio-economic challenges such as having the lowest Social Connectedness and higher Economic Stress. However, they are not highly aggressive or callous – this indicates that this group can overcome challenges in social skills and civic activity with the right interventions, thereby becoming positive citizens.

The groups also tend to disagree on political visions, with the two ethnonationalist groups more reluctant about ethnic integration and the two anti-ethnonationalist groups strongly supporting reconciliation. Furthermore,

the two anti-ethnonationalist groups tend to be more progressive, supporting gender equality and multi-ethnic political cooperation more, while being more reluctant about religion's role in politics.

Intergroup relations also characterise the five groups. Active Anti-Ethnonationalists tend to have the most Contact with other ethnic groups, while the Passive Ethnonationalists have much less frequent Contact. Active Ethnonationalists overall have very turbulent inter-ethnic relations, as they feel greater Cultural Distance, Social Threat and Tension to other ethnic groups. Together with the already discussed higher Violent Civic Behaviour and Aggression scores, this is a worrying sign.

Overall Social Tolerance is higher in the two Anti-Ethnonationalist groups, particularly towards people from other ethnic groups. Interestingly, although the Active Ethnonationalists have the lowest scores in overall Social Tolerance, they are more tolerant of extremist groups (Četniks, Ustaša, Salafi Muslims). This may demonstrate a normalisation of radical ideologies among the Active Ethnonationalists. Note that we do not see this in Passive Ethnonationalists, as they do not tolerate such groups as much. Compared to Active Ethnonationalists, Passive Ethnonationalists are less callous, aggressive, and have lower levels of tension with other ethnic groups. All this cements the idea that Passive Ethnonationalists are markedly different from Active Ethnonationalists in their conceptions, and that a policy of resolving their tensions and economic marginalisation while building on their resilience against violence could shift their mindset towards a more inclusive one.

The groups can also be assessed in terms of their resilience scores. Interestingly, Resilience Against Violent Civic Behaviour is high in the Passive Ethnonationalists, while both active groups are fragile (see Section 2.4 on resilience against radicalisation). This means that Passive Ethnonationalists tend to support nationalist narratives but stop short of agitating violently for the enactment of their ideology. Their profile may give insights into halting or slowing the final stages of violent ethnonationalist radicalisation. Contrarily, the Active Ethnonationalists the Active Anti-Ethnonationalists tend to be more fragile to developing violent forms of civic behaviour due to their passionately held beliefs and high Civic Engagement, which may more easily be derailed into violent agitation.

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[26] Critical Media Literacy and Growth Mindset were both drivers of positive citizenship and resilience factors for remaining active in face of adversity, as outlined in Chapter 1.

Figure 21: Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina with bar charts of membership of citizens in each group. In each case, the largest group's percentage is shown.

The Active Anti-Ethnonationalist group is very [resilient](#) in the face of Economic Stress or a lack of civic spaces, while Passive Anti-Ethnonationalists are extremely fragile to such challenges, and relapse into passivity. Focussing on building this form of resilience will buttress Active Citizenship in regions where Passive Anti-Ethnonationalists form a majority or plurality. Factors associated with resilience of activism are discussed in [Section 1.4](#) on resilience.

3.2 Distribution of the Profiles Across Bosnia and Herzegovina

We see great variation in group membership among the regions and cantons of Bosnia and Herzegovina. [Figure 21](#) shows that each area has a unique spread of individuals across the five groups. This map can be used to target each area differently, as each group will require a different intervention, either to reduce ethnonationalism or to increase levels of Active Citizenship, depending on the needs and challenges of each group. Because the mainstream group has such lukewarm scores on most

political and attitudinal scales, it is likely that the more extreme groups dominate the socio-political space of a community, and set the tone in terms of activism and ethnonationalist tendencies. Therefore, it is useful to observe which are the second largest groups or smallest groups, and tailor local or regional strategies accordingly.

In Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Goražde and Istočno Sarajevo – Pale, Passive Anti-Ethnonationalists are the largest group, meaning that interventions to boost civic engagement and reduce passivity should be prioritised, without there being a significant concern that activism may become derailed into divisive or ethnonationalists directions. The same cannot be said for areas like Bijeljina and West Herzegovina Canton, where Passive Ethnonationalists make up a large chunk of citizens, and those citizens who are active tend to be Ethnonationalists rather than Anti-Ethnonationalists. This means that attempts to generate civic engagement should be even more vigilant in navigating nationalist ideologies, as a possible negative effect of more engagement could be a strengthening of ethnonationalist forms of activism – like the profile of Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, where Active Ethnonationalists are the plurality. There, citizens are not in need of more civic engagement but rather a shift in attitudes towards more cohesive and less ethnonationalistic tendencies, and interventions should focus on building resilience against Ethnonationalist Ideology rather than Civic Engagement. The most promising profiles are found in Sarajevo Canton and Brčko District where Active Anti-Ethnonationalists form a large segment of society and outnumber both Passive and Active Ethnonationalists put together.

3.3 Key Findings

1. Achieving Active Civic Behaviour and combating Ethnonationalism should not be taken as two unrelated goals. They have a complicated overlap and cannot be seen in isolation. Each of the profiles need tailored interventions supporting their weak points and reinforcing their strengths.

2. Active Ethnonationalists make up 15% of society. More extreme members of this group would probably serve as a reservoir of recruitment to radical groups, since they have high scores in Aggression, normalisation of political violence, higher tolerance of radical groups, and are fragile to developing even more ethnonationalism and Violent Citizenship. They have lower Mental Wellbeing and feel threatened by other ethnic

groups, so assuaging such fears and resolving psychosocial issues should be a priority for this group. It is important to build resilience to ethnonationalism and violent citizenship in areas where this profile is more prevalent, such as Herzegovina Neretva Canton.

3. Active Anti-Ethnonationalists have positive scores in civic and intergroup indicators. Although they are progressive on gender issues and inter-communal relations, they are fragile when it comes to sliding towards Violent Citizenship and may need support to channel their Civic Engagement only towards peaceful aims using non-violent means.

4. Passive Anti-Ethnonationalists are very tolerant and harmonious but have lost Trust in NGOs and Political Parties. They have turned away from Active Citizenship, perhaps in disillusionment from the socio-political scene of BiH. They therefore need empowerment as their harmonious attitudes would be a boon to public discourse and praxis. Rebuilding trust as well as limiting obstacles for engagement and dispelling perceptions of political motives of NGOs should be prioritised.

5. Each region has a markedly different proportion of the four profiles, and therefore regional policies can be tailored to focus on whichever groups are dominant in that area.

3.4 Appendix

	Mainstream	Active Anti-Ethno-nation-alists	Passive Anti-Ethno-nation-alists	Passive Ethno-nation-alists	Active Ethno-nation-alists
Civic Awareness	3.2	4.6*	2.9	2.4†	4.7*
Inclusive Civic Identity	6.2	7.6*	6.9	5.1†	5.7
Sense of Civic Responsibility	4.8	6.0*	4.0†	4.3	5.4
Violent Civic Behaviour	2.0	1.7	0.8†	1.7	3.0*
Passive Citizenship Orientation	4.9	2.3†	7.5*	6.2	3.7
Information Consumption	6.0	6.5	4.5†	5.6	7.0*
Wartime Perspective Taking	5.4	6.7*	5.4	4.6*	5.3
Trust in Government Institutions	4.0*	3.3†	3.3†	3.8	4.3*
Trust in Local NGOs	3.6	4.0*	2.9†	3.1†	4.1*
Trust in all Political Parties	3.1	2.4†	2.3†	3.2	3.7*
Social Connectedness: Family	8.1	9.1*	8.8	7.6†	8.3
Age	43	42†	47*	47*	40†
Religiosity	8.2	7.4†	7.5†	8.6*	8.9*
Strength of City Identity	5.9	7.9*	6.5	5.3†	5.3†
Economic Stress	5.3	4.7†	5.7*	5.6*	4.9†
Exposure to Interethnic Conflict	1.0†	1.3	0.8†	1.2	1.6*
Tolerant Religiosity	6.7	8.1*	7.8*	6.3†	6.5†
Cooperation	7.6	8.5*	8.2*	7.1†	7.6
Critical Media Literacy	6.7	8.4*	7.3	5.9†	7.2
Negotiation	7.2	8.4*	7.6	6.6†	7.3

Growth Mindset	6.5	8.4*	6.3	5.3†	7.2
Gender Equality Mindset	6.6	7.7*	7.8*	6.2†	6.6
Mental Wellbeing	8.6	8.9*	9.1*	8.5	7.9†
Islamophobia	3.1	2.0†	2.6	3.9*	4.0*
Aggression	2.0	2.1	1.6†	2.1	2.9*
Callousness	1.2	0.6†	0.6†	1.4	1.9*
Support for Multiethnic Politics	6.6	8.3*	7.7	6.0†	6.4
Support for Religion in Politics	4.0	2.3†	2.4†	4.7	5.3*
Future Vision: Reconciliatory Political System	6.6	8.2*	7.3	5.4†	6.0
Future Vision: Single Presidency	6.3	7.7*	5.9	5.1†	5.9
Future Vision: Integration of FBiH and RS	5.0	6.5*	5.2	4.3†	4.5†
Future Vision: EU Entry	6.6	7.8*	6.6	5.8†	6.4
Future Vision: Separation of Ethnic Groups & Division into Three States	3.6	2.0†	2.8	4.1*	4.2*
Future Vision: Declaration of RS Independence	3.3	1.9†	2.8	4.3*	4.2*
Future Vision: Independence Referendum for RS	3.3	1.9†	2.7	4.4*	4.2*
Contact Quantity with Outgroups	4.5	6.4*	4.6	2.9†	4.3
Cultural Distance Towards Outgroups	5.2	3.6†	4.4	6.6*	6.8*
Social Threat from other Groups	2.9	1.9†	1.5†	3.7	4.3*
Tension with Outgroups	4.3	3.2†	3.4†	5.3*	5.1*
Social Tolerance	6.7	8.1*	7.6	5.4†	6.4
Social Tolerance: People from a Different Ethnic Group	7.9	9.5*	9.1*	6.7†	7.3
Social Tolerance: Extremist Groups	2.6	2.4	1.9†	2.5	3.4*
Resilience against Ethnonationalist Ideology	0.0	1.4*	1.1	-1.2†	-1.2†
Resilience against Violent Civic Behaviour	-0.1	-0.2†	0.4*	0.5*	-0.4†
Resilience for being Active in the face of Economic Stress	0.0	2.0*	-1.9†	-1.7	1.8
Resilience for being Active in the face of a lack of Civic Spaces	0.1	2.2*	-2.0†	-1.7	2.0

Table 11: Mean scores for Civic Behaviour and Ideology Profiles. Statistically significant differences are denoted by asterisks if that group's score is higher or daggers if that group's score is lower. Table shows selected indicators which describe the profile groups. Effect sizes of these differences ranged from F = 15 to F = 200.

4. Intergroup Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The harmonious coexistence of groups with different ethnic, religious or sociodemographic backgrounds is essential to the healthy functioning of a cohesive society. The first part of this chapter will focus on the levels of Tension with Outgroups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the trends seen compared to SCORE BiH 2014 (Section 4.1). Predictive modelling in Section 4.2 reveals the prerequisites for harmonious interethnic coexistence and how to mitigate negative perceptions and feelings towards other ethnic groups. Section 4.3 will discuss the commonalities between ethnic groups, highlighting unifying messages based on similar future visions for the country, civic attitudes, moral values, identity, and insecurities. By considering this multi-dimensional approach to intergroup relations, the results can directly inform strategies for preventing Tension with Outgroups and fostering social cohesion.

	Bosniaks	Croats	Serbs
Positive Feelings Towards Outgroups	4.7	5.8	4.9
Trust Towards Outgroups	2.8	2.6	2.8
Social Anxiety Towards Outgroups	2.4	1.1	2.0
Social Distance Towards Outgroups	3.8	3.2	3.1
Stereotypes Towards Outgroups	3.9	3.6	3.7
Tension with Outgroups	**4.5**	**3.8**	**4.2**

Table 12: Ethnic distribution of sub-indicators for Tension with Outgroups.

SCORE assesses relationships between the three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) and minority groups (e.g. Jews, Roma, LGBTQ+ etc.). SCORE BiH 2020 analyses ethnic relationships through an emotional, behavioural, and attitude-driven approach to develop a broad picture of intergroup dynamics in the country. The emotional approach tackles people's anxieties, Positive Feelings, and a feeling of confidence through trust in other ethnic groups. The behavioural approach focusses on the amount of perceived contact people have with other ethnic groups in everyday life. The attitude-driven approach investigates Stereotypes,

Cultural and Social Distance, and perceived Social Threat of others to the community or their own ethnic group. Combining the three approaches reveals the root causes and the current reality of intergroup tensions, and what could resolve them. Therefore, SCORE's composite Tension with Outgroups indicator is comprised of indicators measuring Social Anxiety, Social Distance, Stereotypes, lack of Positive Feelings and lack of Trust that respondents feel towards people from other ethnic groups with which they do not identify[27].

4.1 The State of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina

SCORE BiH 2020 combined five indicators (Positive Feelings, Trust, Social Anxiety, Social Distance,

Figure 22: Tension with Outgroups

Stereotypes) to capture the different layers of Tension with Outgroups. Respondents were asked to express their perceptions and feelings towards each of the ethnic groups, and their responses contributed to an overall score out of 10, which are shown in Table 12.

The results give a varied picture of the intergroup dynamics in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the level of the indicators that make up Tension with Outgroups averaging around 4 out of 10 across the ethnic groups.

All three ethnic groups show low levels of Social Anxiety, demonstrating that they do not feel threatened in the presence of people from other ethnic groups. Less than 1% of Croats feel extremely anxious in the presence of other groups. This figure increases for Serbs and Bosniaks; approximately 5% of Serbs feel

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[27] Intergroup harmony is the reverse of intergroup tension. More detailed descriptions of the indicators that make up these scales can be found in the Indicator Glossary.

extremely anxious in the presence of outgroups, while 7% of Bosniaks feel extremely anxious in the presence of Serbs, and 5% feel extremely anxious in the presence of Croats.

The majority of respondents, most notably Croats (3.2) and Serbs (3.1), feel little Social Distance and are willing to accept the other ethnic group as co-workers, close friends, and, to a lesser extent, as close relatives by marriage.

On average one in three respondents believe that people from other ethnic groups are violent or dishonest (this increases to 40% in Bosniak respondents), while, on average, one in ten have perceptions of outgroup homogeneity (higher in Serb respondents)[28].

Figure 23: Cultural Distance towards Outgroups

In contrast, there is a sense of mistrust towards other ethnic groups; approximately one in five respondents do not trust other ethnicities at all, while mistrust is prevalent in Croat and Serb respondents towards Roma (40% and 31% do not trust Roma at all, respectively) and, to a lesser extent, in Croat and Bosniak respondents towards Jews (31% and 26%, respectively). People tend to harbour lukewarm feelings towards other ethnicities – averaging around 5 out of 10 (Table 12).

Intergroup indicators are the same across age groups and genders but differ by settlement type – with rural areas reporting higher levels of Tension with Outgroups.

The heatmap in Figure 22 displays the regional levels of Tension with Outgroups, where 0 corresponds to no tension and 10 to high levels of tension present in the region. The map shows higher levels of tension in Bijeljina, Prijedor and in Tuzla Canton.

In Prijedor the Serb majority feels higher levels of tension to other groups compared to the tension felt by minority groups (Bosniaks) in this region. In Prijedor, these tensions are rooted in a feeling of anxiety towards the other groups.

Tuzla Canton shows similar dynamics: the Bosniak majority mainly feels tension towards Serbs, expressing more negative stereotypes about them. Providing a platform where people can express and deal with fears, by identifying and tackling the roots of the anxiety may dispel this perception. On the other hand, in Bijeljina the Serb majority and the Bosniak minority feel equal levels of tensions towards each other, but also towards Croats. As mentioned earlier, the ethnic groups are disconnected from each other in Bijeljina as seen by the low frequency of contact with the outgroup (2.0).

Lower scores for Tension with Outgroups are observed in Doboj and Istočno Sarajevo, where Serbs have more Positive Feelings towards the other and feel less anxious in the presence of other groups. In the Federation, Bosnian-Podrinje Canton scores low on tension as Bosniaks are more willing to accept both Serbs and Croats in their personal circles. People in Brčko project very low levels of Negative Stereotypes towards other ethnic groups, contributing to the low level of Tension with Outgroups in the district.

People reported their Cultural Distance towards Outgroups based on values, culture, and history. Over half of respondents from all ethnic groups acknowledge their cultural similarities (e.g. food, music, habits, customs, and language) with other ethnic groups; this amounts to 63% of Bosniak respondents, 55% of Croat respondents and 58% of Serb respondents. Respondents view their history as the most different. One in two Bosniak respondents feel distant from other ethnicities in terms of history, compared to over 60% of Croat respondents and just under 60% of Serb respondents. The heatmap (Figure 23) shows that people in Trebinje, Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, and West Herzegovina Canton feel culturally disconnected from other ethnic groups.

[28] Bosniaks believe that 41% of Serbs and 39% of Croats are dishonest, 36% of Serbs and 29% of Croats are violent, and 13% of Serbs and 12% of Croats are all the same. Serbs believe that 31% of Bosniaks and 32% of Croats are dishonest, 28% of Bosniaks and 30% of Croats are violent, 16% of Bosniaks and 17% of Croats are all the same. Croats believe that 31% of Bosniaks and 29% of Serbs are dishonest, 26% of Bosniaks and 31% of Serbs are violent, 9% of Bosniaks and Serb are all the same.

Uniform Municipalities

	Municipality	Tension
Top 5 Highest Tension with Out-groups	Ilidža/Istočna Ilidža	**7.2**
	Ilijaš	**6.6**
	Bosanska Krupa	**5.9**
	Kalesija	**5.8**
	Ilidža	**5.7**
	Municipality	Tension
Bottom 5 Lowest Tension with Out-groups	Foča-RS	**2.9**
	Tomislavgrad	**2.7**
	Stijena	**2.3**
	Gornji Rahić	**2.0**
	Maoča	**1.8**

Mixed Municipalities

	Municipality	Tension
Top 5 Highest Tension with Out-groups	Zvornik	**6.1**
	Srebrenica	**5.0**
	Bratunac	**4.9**
	Prijedor	**4.8**
	Bosanski Petrovac	**4.6**
	Respect for Human Rights	**0.22**
	Municipality	Tension
Bottom 5 Lowest Tension with Out-groups	Mostar Zapad	**3.1**
	Brčko District	**3.1**
	Gradačac/Pelagićevo	**3.1**
	Mostar Stari Grad	**3.1**
	Teslić	**2.9**

Table 13: Uniform and Mixed Municipalities, ranked by level of Tension with Outgroups.

Frequency of contact between ethnic groups was also surveyed. Results show that 53% Croats have contact with outgroups at least 2 times per week compared to 39% of Bosniaks and 38% of Serbs. The majority of people in Bijeljina, Trebinje, West Herzegovina Canton, and Istočno Sarajevo have little contact with other ethnic groups, which should be considered as target regions to increase interaction.

4.1.1 Comparing Ethnically Mixed and Uniform Municipalities

SCORE BiH assessed 66 municipalities across Bosnia and Herzegovina, of which 39 are uniform (one ethnic group accounts for over 80% of the population) and 27 are mixed (minorities make up at least 20% of the population). The differences in Tension with Outgroups between the two types of municipalities were explored (Table 13).

Figure 24: Social Tolerance - Percentage of respondents who would accept to interact with these groups personally.

In uniform municipalities we observe two extremes, with the highest score in tension in Ilidža/Istočna Ilidža (7.2) and the lowest score in Maoča (1.8). It should be noted that respondents in Ilidža/Istočna Ilidža also strongly support Serb Nationalist Narratives (9.9) and report high exposure to these narratives through traditional media and politicians. People living in Ilijaš, which has relatively high Tension with Outgroups, do not show a significantly higher support for Bosniak Nationalist Narratives, despite reporting exposure to them on a frequent basis.

Some mixed municipalities also show high levels of Tension with Outgroups. People from Zvornik have higher tension and expressed a higher support for Serb Nationalist Narratives (8.0). Out of the 10 mixed municipalities with the highest tension, 4 are in Bijeljina

	Bosniaks	Croats	Serbs
Positive Feelings	Decrease	Decrease	Decrease
Trust	Increase	Increased towards Serbs	Increase
Social Anxiety	Small increase towards Croats	Small decrease towards Serbs	Small increase
Social Distance	Increase	Increase	Decrease
Stereotypes	Increase towards Serbs as violent	Increase towards outgroups as violent	Increase
Cultural Distance	Small decrease based on culture	Increase based on values	Small increase based on values
Contact	Decrease with Serbs but increase with Croats	Decrease with Bosniaks but increase with Serbs	Increase with Croats

Table 14: Change in intergroup indicators compared to 2014.

(Zvornik, Srebrenica, Bratunac, and Vlasenica) where people have little contact with other ethnicities and feel higher Cultural Distance. Mixed municipalities with high tension may be more worrying than uniform municipalities with high tension, since in mixed municipalities there is a possibility for tensions to materialise into Marginalisation, exclusion or even violence. Therefore, mixed municipalities with higher levels of tension may represent a higher priority than uniform municipalities, where there is less opportunity for attitudes and perceptions to manifest into action.

4.1.2 Marginalised and Minority Groups

SCORE BiH 2020 also assessed people's tolerance towards marginalised or minority groups. Respondents were asked whether they would be happy to interact personally with various groups, shown in Figure 24. Approximately 80% of people would not be willing interact with people belonging to the LGBTQ+ community. On the other hand, there is solid ground for fostering communication between ethnic groups as the majority would be willing to interact with people from a different ethnic or religious group, and with returnees (Figure 24). Interventions should focus on emphasizing common ground and respect for marginalised groups such as Roma, Jews (Figure 24 and above), and people who are part of the LGBTQ+ community.

4.1.3 Trends in Intergroup Indicators from 2014 to 2019

Specific intergroup questions were surveyed in 2014 and 2019, allowing SCORE to track the changes over time. The findings below should be interpreted with caution as a panel sample was not used and indicators differed in measurement scales and wording.

Compared to 2014, intergroup relations have worsened in terms of respondents reporting more negative feelings, Social Distance and violent stereotypes towards other ethnic groups. In 2014, 33% Bosniaks responded "No" to accepting Serbs as a close relatives by marriage; in 2019 50% would definitely not accept this or would only accept it if their concerns were addressed (Social Distance). For Croat respondents towards Bosniaks, these figures were 11% in 2014 and 47% in 2019. Negative stereotypes also increased; 11% of Serbs in 2014 answered "Yes" to the question "Are Bosniaks violent?", compared to 28% who agree or strongly agree in 2019. Their perception towards Croats changed in a similar way from 13% in 2014 to 30% in 2019. Furthermore, Bosniak respondents report a decrease in contact with Serbs and an increase in contact with Croats.

Nevertheless, there is a steady increase in trust in other ethnicities across all three groups. 49% of Bosniaks considered Serbs to be "Trustworthy" in 2014 and in 2019 78% thought Serbs can "Completely", "Mostly" or "Somewhat" be trusted. The level of trust of Serb

Figure 25: Regression showing the factors which impact levels of Tension with Outgroups. Blue arrows represent positive relationship, where the driver increases tension, while red arrows represent a negative driver undermining tension. The thickness of the arrow indicates the strength of the relationship, the thicker the arrow the stronger the effect on Tension with Outgroups. The model was controlled for age and gender. For model results and statistical fit parameters see Appendix. Thin arrows represent beta weights between 0.04 and 0.09. Thick arrows represent beta weights between 0.17 and 0.20.

respondents towards Bosniaks increased from 38% in 2014 to 82% in 2019.

As seen in the previous section, Trust and Positive Feelings towards the other remain low. Although Cultural and Social Distance are relatively low in 2019, the increasing trend from 2014 indicates that respondents have a tendency to differentiate themselves from the other based on characteristics such as values and history, while distancing themselves from other ethnic groups when it comes to personal relationships. Identifying success factors in regions or across groups where intergroup dynamics have improved, as well as obstacles in challenging areas are expected to inform effective interventions.

4.2 Fostering Harmony Between Ethnic Groups

Preventing and mitigating ethnic tensions requires interventions focusing at the personal, community, and government levels. To identify the positive and negative drivers of Tension with Outgroups, a regression was run, revealing the factors which underpin tension and harmony in BiH. Figure 25 presents the drivers of Tension with Outgroups for the full sample. Positive drivers lead to increased levels of Tension with Outgroups, whereas negative drivers reduce Tension and therefore can be considered to foster harmony.

The four strongest factors which impact citizens' level of tension with other ethnic groups are: Ethnonationalist Ideology, Cultural Distance towards Outgroups, Islamophobia, and Contact Quantity with Outgroups. These drivers represent a general estrangement from the other, a lack of acknowledgement of common ground, and a view of the other as a threat to one's own values. Two of these drivers (Ethnonationalist Ideology and Islamophobia) are ideologies which are associated with particular narratives and perceptions which need to be countered with alternative messaging. The root causes which generate support for such ideologies also need to be addressed. These root causes include Economic Stress and media consumption (see Section 2.3), as well as unresolved traumas stemming from exposure to interethnic conflicts. If these root causes cannot be fully addressed, then interventions focussing on building resilience against developing Ethnonationalist Ideology can be deployed (see Section 2.4 on how to build this kind of resilience).

Cultural Distance and lack of contact with other ethnic groups go hand in hand and contribute to maintaining tension and negative perceptions about the other. More frequent contact will undermine the perception that Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats are fundamentally different in terms of history and culture and will erode perceptions that the three groups have origins and values that are somehow irreconcilably different. Where contact cannot be conveniently encouraged, in isolated

or ethnically uniform areas, reducing perceptions of Cultural Distance with Outgroups can form the basis of alternative interventions. Contact need not always be in person but can include coming into contact with the history and heritage of another group through cultural functions.

Beyond these key four drivers, there are other factors which significantly impact levels of tension. People who feel socially excluded or discriminated against have a higher tendency to develop Tension with Outgroups. This feeling of Marginalisation is not solely based on ethnicity[29], and includes a feeling of exclusion based on income, gender, and education level. The importance of tackling Marginalisation becomes evident in the case of marginalised youth, who feel less Political Security, report a higher Exposure to Ethnonationalist Narratives, and have a higher level of Exposure to Adversities (such as Exposure to Domestic Abuse and Direct Conflict Exposure), the latter two of which are also drivers of Ethnonationalist Ideology. Marginalised youth have more Trust in Local and International NGOs, who would therefore be effective in connecting with this group. Critical Media Literacy is a driver of Intergroup Harmony and appears to make people reflective of the ethnonationalist narratives they may be exposed to.

Respect for Human Rights is another driver of Intergroup Harmony, demonstrating the importance of an inclusive mindset based on equal values and how this can mitigate feelings of tension between ethnic groups. Conversely, Religiosity increases Tension with Outgroups, indicating the need for Tolerant Religiosity, which was also found to build resilience against adopting an Ethnonationalist Ideology and expressing this violently (See Section 2.5).

Satisfaction with Civic Life[30] (delivery of healthcare, education, security, passing laws, interethnic relations etc.), personal life[31] (job, health status, life overall), and being trusting of local institutions (e.g. mayor, MZ, local administration, police) drive Intergroup Harmony. These findings demonstrate the connective importance of local authorities in a community, and the role that the perceived effectiveness and trustworthiness of the state plays in decreasing tensions.

Surprisingly, individuals who experience more Economic Stress tend to feel less Tension with Outgroups and are therefore more harmonious with other ethnic groups. This may demonstrate that higher income and more economically secure individuals feel more tensions

towards ethnic outgroups compared to working class or more precariously employed citizens. An explanation for this may be that wealthier people feel that their economic status is under threat by other ethnic groups, and therefore hold negative attitudes towards outgroups. Alternatively, less economically secure strata of society may be less preoccupied with interethnic issues as concerns about their livelihood take priority. A defence of the interests of the wealthy elite could be associated with nationalists advocating for the exclusive interests of their ethnicity (Kapidžić, 2019). Economic Stress was also found to be a driver both of ethnonationalist and Salafi tendencies (Section 2.3). Therefore, while empowering the economically fragile will contribute to defusing polarizing narratives, focus should be placed on the interethnic concerns of middle-income individuals.

The regression presented above was also run separately on respondents from each ethnic group, to investigate any differences in the drivers of Tension with Outgroups. Notable differences include that the Tension with Outgroups felt by Bosniak respondents is not influenced by Trust in Local Institutions, use of Štela, or by Economic Stress. For Bosniaks, being reflective of the information consumed (Critical Media Literacy) appears to have a stronger effect on decreasing Tension with Outgroups.

In contrast, among Serb respondents, Critical Media Literacy skills have no influence, while the more frequent use of Štela is closely associated with Tension with Outgroups.

Croat respondents are less influenced by their perception of authorities, but the tension they feel depends more on their mental health and the extent to which they feel marginalised. While Ethnonationalist Ideology is a key factor which drives tension for Serbs and Bosniaks, among Croats it is Islamophobia which underpins Tension with Outgroups.

Beyond what is shown in Figure 25, several other potential factors were tested, to check if they had statistically significant effect on generating or reducing intergroup tensions. Indicators of civic orientation, identity, taking responsibility for the conflict, and exposure to the conflict did not have a significant effect on Tension with Outgroups. Although an inclusive, reconciliatory attitude and interpersonal skills can be characteristics of tolerant citizens feeling low levels of tension, these are not expected to directly reduce tensions. Decreasing tension depends on tackling contagious narratives and divisive

[29] Perceived ethnicity-based marginalisation decreased from 94% in 2014 to 81% in 2019.

[30] Civic Satisfaction averaged 4.0 in 2014 compared to 4.1 in 2019. The biggest difference was seen in Satisfaction with the Course of the Economy (1.9 in 2014; 3.6 in 2019).

[31] Life Satisfaction increased from 5.6 in 2014 to 6.9 in 2019.

ideologies, fostering more contact, the development of an inclusive economic environment and transparency and efficacy of authorities and services.

4.3 Identifying Common Ground Between Ethnic Groups

Building cohesion and resilience in communities can also be tackled by promoting the positive attitudes, values, and visions that are common across all groups. Commonalities shared among the ethnic groups can serve as the bedrock upon which to establish healthy social relations which are resilient to adversities and shocks.

	Bosniaks	Croats	Serbs
Inclusive Civic Identity	6.6	6.3	5.5
Importance of Identity	8.0	8.8	8.3
Strength of Identity: Citizen of BiH	8.8	7.2	5.2
Tolerant Religiosity	6.8	7.3	7.1
Support for Multi-Ethnic Politics	7.1	6.4	6.6
Support for Inclusive Education Reform	6.5	5.2	5.4
Wartime Perspective Taking	5.7	5.5	5.0

Table 15: Scores in key indicators used to highlight the commonalities across the three ethnic groups.

SCORE BiH 2020 measured the extent to which respondents support an Inclusive Civic Identity, defined as the support for building a common identity and the belief that there are more unifying than separating factors between the ethnic groups of BiH. All groups achieved an average score over 5, implying that all ethnic groups are supportive of an inclusive identity. However, precisely specifying this harmonious identity requires further exploration. For example, the results show that people who consider themselves to be Bosnian or citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are more likely to be open towards other groups in society. Across all three ethnicities, identity remains a personal trait closely related more to ethnicity and religion rather than to citizenship or to the country. This importance of one's

ethnic or religious identity could therefore be a risk for polarization.

Nevertheless, a majority across all ethnic groups display a tolerant and open attitude towards other ethno-religious groups and are willing to accept them in their community and closely interact with them (Figure 24). An Inclusive Civic Identity can embrace and respect differences across ethnic groups, without necessarily aiming to forge a common identity based on ethnicity or religion, but rather on a sense of pride for one's city, region or country as a multi-cultural space. This kind of overarching identity was also found to be a key resilience factor against adopting ethnonationalism (Section 2.4), and therefore efforts to forge civic and regional pride should be reinforced.

Perceptions of the other are also shaped by religion, and religion can be a point of contestation and source of tension, as discussed above. However, a prevailing group of citizens are tolerant and respecting of other religions, and 83% of respondent agree that "God cares for all people, regardless of their religion or ethnicity", while 56% acknowledge that there is some truth in other religions. There is, therefore, a foundation upon which Tolerant Religiosity, which is also a resilience factor against radicalisation, can be built.

Other areas where common ground can be found include educational policies, ethnic cooperation, and the geopolitical and constitutional future of the country. Most respondents are supportive of an inclusive, multi-ethnic system both in politics and in education. 73% believe that "parties which only focus on one ethnic group are bad for Bosnia" and 74% agree that "it is important that each political party ensures political representation of all ethnic groups, not only one". However, voting for a politician from another ethnicity still forms a barrier for many, as 41% would not vote for a politician from a different ethnic group.

Regarding education, 67% of people support the abolishment of the "Two Schools under one Roof" system. Furthermore, 70% of citizens are in favour of teaching history through a multi-perspective approach that includes voices of all ethnic groups. Currently, 67% of respondents are willing to accept that their ethnic group were not just victims, but also perpetrators during the war. There is a need for interventions which recognise the mutual suffering during the conflict as 32% do not believe their ethnic group needs to apologise for the crimes committed.

Figure 26: Percentage of respondents who support certain Future Visions for the Future of BiH

SCORE BiH 2020 also measured respondents' attitudes towards various geopolitical visions for the country. There is strong grassroots support for a reconciliatory political system, with majorities in the three ethnic groups agreeing that Bosnia and Herzegovina "should change the current political system into a system that would enable more cooperation, cohesion and reconciliation among all constituent ethnic groups and others" (Figure 26). Though this may indicate that there is still impetus for a monumental change in politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, support for a reconciliatory political system decreased from 69% in 2014 to 62% in 2019. EU entry is also very strongly supported among Croats and Bosniaks, but Serbs are less enthusiastic, with only 40% of Serbs agreeing (although only 35% of Serbs disagree, with the remaining Serbs equivocating). EU entry can therefore only become a common vision only when Serbs' concerns are allayed. Support for EU entry increased from 55% in 2014 to 68% in 2019.

A reconciliatory political system is also more popular than any other of the future visions, for any of the ethnic groups. Among Bosniaks, it is more popular than the abolishment of the RS; among Croats, it is more popular than a Croat-majority third entity; among Serbs it is more popular than an independence referendum for the RS. Sharing these results will highlight that all ethnic groups do prefer to work together to forge a common cooperative state rather than devolve into mono-ethnic areas. This evidence will empower policymakers, activists and changemakers and even

average citizens who have turned away from civic engagement in disappointment with the nationalistic overtones of current civic life, to work towards a common future vision of a cohesive and resilient Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4.4 Key Findings

1. The quality of intergroup relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is mixed – neither positive nor totally dire. The remaining issues are a lack of trust, a perception of the other as violent, and the ethnic groups increasingly perceiving they have different culture, history and values from other groups.

2. Geographic areas in need of interventions on reducing tensions and negative intergroup attitudes include Bijeljina, Prijedor, Tuzla Canton, Zvornik, Ilidža. Areas with low tension, where a majority of people have harmonious attitudes towards other ethnic groups, should be explored as case studies, and their success stories magnified as a beacon of harmony. Brčko, Doboj (and Teslić in particular), and Bosnian-Podrinje Canton can therefore be examples for similar neighbouring areas.

3. Encouraging inter-ethnic contact while also dispelling perceptions of fundamental cultural differences between the ethnic groups will greatly contribute to reducing Tension with Outgroups. Ethnonationalism and Islamophobia (particularly in Croats) contribute to mistrust and tension of other ethnic groups and need to be confronted head on. Their root causes must be addressed while also investing in resilience factors.

4. The roots of interethnic tension are not just ideological, but also tap into low quality of life, disappointment with services and with local institutions. Grievances about poor governance generate interethnic hate and need to be resolved before real progress towards harmony can be made.

5. Certain groups of society, such as the LGBTQ+ community, refugees and asylum seekers, Roma and Jews do not enjoy tolerance of the majority. Campaigns dispelling negative perceptions about each of these groups must be carried out, while the groups themselves need to be empowered and supported, as they may not enjoy the benefits of social connectivity that members of ethnic majorities do.

6. There is consensus among the ethnic groups to move towards a multi-ethnic reconciliatory political system with multi-ethnic parties, and an inclusive education that portrays voices from all sides, with a balanced discussion of the past. All this is underpinned by a tolerant respect of other religions, and broad support for an inclusive, encompassing identity based on being citizens of a common country. Socialising these results will give impetus to policymakers and activists in Bosnia and Herzegovina who are trying to forge a modern, multi-ethnic, and open society from the ashes of a difficult past.

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[32] Municipalities: Velika Kladuša, Srebrenica, Bužim, Bratunac, Donji Vakuf, Laktaši, Gornji Vakuf, Čelinac, Milići, Prnjavor, Vlasenica, Gradiška; Villages: Jablanica, Gornji Rahić, Maoča, Orahovica, Stijena.

5. Methodology

5.1 Survey Methodology and Sampling Information

Data collection for this study was carried out between October 2019 and March 2020. The survey was administered using face-to-face computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). Focus groups were carried out between November and December 2019 to inform certain aspects of questionnaire design. Focus groups and interviews were carried out by Prism Research, Sarajevo, using the "Survey To Go" application.

The sampling strategy was based on the BiH 2013 census and Prism Research estimates to ensure a nationally representative sample of urban and rural adult citizens across all regions of BiH, meeting minimum quotas at municipality level to allow for the statistical analyses required. The nationally representative sample amounted to 3637 participants. Households were selected using the random walk method and respondents selected using the last birthday method. The study also included two distinct booster samples that were used to collect data for priority communities and municipalities relevant to the work of BHRI, and to oversample the youth population (18 to 35 years old). Household selection for these samples was also carried out using the random walk method. For the priority community/municipality sample, respondents were selected using the last birthday method. For the youth sample, respondents were selected based on their eligibility for the 18 to 35-year-old quota, ensuring gender and regional representation.

All analyses were run on the representative sample unless otherwise stated.

SAMPLE INFORMATION	
Representative	3637
Youth	528
Booster municipalities[32]	405
Total sample	**4570**

Table 16: Sampling distribution of main, representative sample and two booster samples (youth and programme area).

5.2 Analysis Methodology

ANOVA	A statistical test to determine whether the mean scores of two or more groups are indistinguishable or if they are significantly different. In the present report, significant differences are only measured where F is larger than 20 and/or Cohen's D effect size between two groups is above medium.
Cluster Analysis	A technique which groups respondents into distinct categories or clusters based on their scores in selected indicators.
Correlation	A measure of the statistically significant association between two variables.
Heatmap	Displays the mean score of an indicator across different geographical areas, illustrating regional differences.
Predictive Modelling	Predictive statistical modelling techniques (such as linear regressions or structural equation modelling) investigate the relationships between dependent variables (the outcome) and one or more independent variables (the drivers, or predictors). Predictive analyses are used to infer directional relationships between a predictor and an outcome.
Resilience Analysis	These analyses identify which personal assets and community resources will most effectively interrupt pathways from risk exposure to detrimental outcomes

5.3 Indicator Glossary

The following table displays all the indicators that were measured in the SCORE BiH 2020 survey. Each respondent achieved a score of 0 to 10 on each of these indicators, and regional and demographic averages can be found on www.scoreforpeace.org/en/bosnia/.

Access to Common Spaces: Community Centres, CSOs, MZs	The extent to which local community spaces are available to the respondent (e.g. community centres, MZ council, youth centres, CSOs).
Access to Common Spaces: Public Outdoor, Community Sports, Cultural	The extent to which local public spaces are available to the respondent (e.g. sports facilities, parks, squares, museums, libraries).
Access to Common Spaces: Religious	The extent to which local religious spaces are available to the respondent (e.g. mosque, church, synagogue).
Active Citizenship	The extent to which respondents would attempt to solve challenges in their community through non-violent means.
Active Citizenship Orientation	The extent to which respondents are willing to work to change current conditions in their community through non-violent means.
Active Civic Behaviour	A composite measure of respondents' civic engagement, willingness to participate in civic initiatives, and the extent to which they would solve challenges in their community using peaceful means.
Aggression	The extent to which respondents are aggressive in daily life, such as frequently being involved in confrontations, and reacting angrily when provoked.
Callousness	The extent to which respondents disregard the feelings or suffering of other people, including a lack of remorse if they have hurt them.
Civic Awareness	The extent to which respondents are aware of the opportunities through which they can become involved in public decision-making, their familiarity with the government structure and their interest in social and political developments in their community.
Civic Engagement	The extent to which respondents participate or engage in formal and informal civic initiatives (e.g. voting in elections, volunteering and charity deeds, community meetings, demonstrations, posting or debating social, political or civic issues online).
Civic Satisfaction	The extent to which respondents are satisfied with governance and service delivery in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the course of the economy, delivery of healthcare and quality of education.
Coexistence	The extent to which respondents support the protection of all ethnic groups' heritage, teaching youth to live peacefully and how open respondents are to live in mixed communities.
Conflict Exposure: Direct	The extent to which respondents and/or their family suffered direct adversity during the war in BiH, including (but not limited to) physical injury, sexual assault, imprisonment, eviction.
Conflict Exposure: Indirect	The extent to which respondents and/or their family members saw soldiers, army vehicles, actual fighting or shelling during the war in BiH.
Contact Quantity with Bosniaks	The average extent of everyday interaction that respondents have with Bosniaks.

Contact Quantity with Croats	The average extent of everyday interaction that respondents have with Croats.
Contact Quantity with Serbs	The average extent of everyday interaction that respondents have with Serbs.
Cooperation	The extent to which respondents are respectful and trusting of people they cooperate with (e.g. at work), appreciative of different people's strengths, and able to cooperate well with others.
Critical Media Literacy	The extent to which respondents are able to critically appraise information they are exposed to, both in the media and from other sources, reaching evidence-based decisions and being cautious of the techniques that media outlets may use to affect their attention and understanding of certain messages.
Cultural Distance Towards Bosniaks	The average extent to which respondents feel that their values, culture (including food, music, customs, language), and history are distant from those of Bosniaks.
Cultural Distance Towards Croats	The average extent to which respondents feel that their values, culture (including food, music, customs, language), and history are distant from those of Croats.
Cultural Distance Towards Serbs	The average extent to which respondents feel that their values, culture (including food, music, customs, language), and history are distant from those of Serbs.
Economic Opportunities	The respondent's perceived availability of employment opportunities in their area.
Economic Security	The extent to which respondents feel confident that they have a stable, basic income, and whether their household income could cover additional costs such as higher education.
Economic Stress	A composite measure of perceived economic insecurity, a lack of economic opportunities, low employment status and low income level.
Education Level	The average level of education (highest qualification completed). 10 indicates PhD level or higher while 0 indicates no formal education.
Employment Status	The average level of current employment. 10 corresponds to full time employment, 5 corresponds to part time employment or student status, 0 corresponds to unemployed or retired status.
Ethnonationalism	The extent to which respondents support an ethnonationalist political ideology, which entails exclusive cooperation within their ethnic group, including securing physical boundaries to ensure that a single ethnic group is a majority within a specific territory, and their unwillingness to find common ground with other ethnic groups.
Ethnonationalist Ideology	A composite measure of respondents' support for an ethnonationalist political ideology, their rejection of coexistence, and the extent to which they agree with nationalist narratives relevant to their ethnic group.
Exposure to Domestic Abuse	The extent to which respondents and/or their family members have previously experienced domestic abuse.
Exposure to Interethnic Conflict	A composite measure of the extent to which respondents and/or their family suffered direct adversity during the war in BiH, alongside present-day exposure to interethnic violence (not during the war).
Exposure to Interethnic Violence	The extent to which respondents and/or their family members have previously experienced interethnic violence (not during the war in BiH).
Exposure to Nationalist Narratives	The extent to which respondents are exposed to opinions in support of nationalist narratives (pertaining to their ethnic group) through different sources, including social networks, educational spaces, media, religious or political figures.
Exposure to Nationalist Narratives in Personal Life	A composite measure of exposure to nationalist narratives (relevant to own ethnic group) through cultural channels, at places of worship, at school, work or university and in social situations.
Exposure to Nationalist Narratives: Cultural Sites or Events	The extent to which respondents have heard opinions in support of nationalist narratives at cultural sites or events.

Exposure to Nationalist Narratives: Friends and Family	The extent to which respondents have heard their friends or family talking in support of nationalist narratives.
Exposure to Nationalist Narratives: Mosque or Church	The extent to which respondents have heard opinions in support of nationalist narratives at religious sites, such as at a mosque or church.
Exposure to Nationalist Narratives: Online Media	The extent to which respondents have been exposed to opinions in support of nationalist narratives through online media.
Exposure to Nationalist Narratives: Politicians	The extent to which respondents have been exposed to politicians talking in support of nationalist narratives.
Exposure to Nationalist Narratives: School, University or Work	The extent to which respondents have heard opinions in support of nationalist narratives at work, school or university.
Exposure to Nationalist Narratives: Traditional Media	The extent to which respondents have been exposed to opinions in support of nationalist narratives through traditional media (e.g. TV, newspapers).
Exposure to Salafi Narratives	The extent to which respondents are exposed to opinions in support of Salafi narratives through different sources, including social circles, educational spaces, media, religious or political figures.
Exposure to Salafi Narratives in Personal Life	A composite measure of exposure to Salafi narratives (relevant to own ethnic group) through cultural channels, at places of worship, at school, work or university and in social situations.
Exposure to Salafi Narratives: Cultural Sites or Events	The extent to which respondents have heard opinions in support of Salafi narratives at cultural sites or events.
Exposure to Salafi Narratives: Friends and Family	The extent to which respondents have heard their friends or family talking in support of Salafi narratives.
Exposure to Salafi Narratives: Mosque or Church	The extent to which respondents have heard opinions in support of Salafi narratives at religious sites, such as at a mosque or church.
Exposure to Salafi Narratives: Online Media	The extent to which respondents have been exposed to opinions in support of Salafi narratives through online media.
Exposure to Salafi Narratives: Politicians	The extent to which respondents have been exposed to politicians talking in support of Salafi narratives.
Exposure to Salafi Narratives: School, University or Work	The extent to which respondents have heard opinions in support of Salafi narratives at work, school or university.
Exposure to Salafi Narratives: Traditional Media	The extent to which respondents have been exposed to opinions in support of Salafi narratives through traditional media (e.g. TV, newspapers).
Future Vision: Abolishment of Cantons	The extent to which respondents support that cantons should be abolished.
Future Vision: Abolishment of RS	The extent to which respondents support the abolishment of Republika Srpska.
Future Vision: Declaration of RS Independence	The extent to which respondents support that Republika Srpska should declare independence.
Future Vision: EU Entry	The extent to which respondents support that BiH should enter the European Union.
Future Vision: Independence Referendum for RS	The extent to which respondents support an independence referendum for Republika Srpska.
Future Vision: Integration of FBiH and RS	The extent to which respondents support the integration of RS and FBiH, working towards a multiethnic and harmonious society.
Future Vision: Majority Croat Cantons as Third Entity	The extent to which respondents support that majority Croat cantons should become a third entity.
Future Vision: NATO Membership	The extent to which respondents support that BiH should enter NATO.

Future Vision: NATO Membership if all Constituent Ethnic Groups Agree	The extent to which respondents support that BiH should enter NATO only if all three constituent ethnic groups agree.
Future Vision: Reconciliatory Political System	The extent to which respondents support a change to a system that would enable more cooperation, cohesion and reconciliation among all constituent ethnic groups and others.
Future Vision: Separation of Ethnic Groups and Division into Three Independent States	The extent to which respondents support that the ethnic groups should go their separate ways, dividing BiH into three independent states.
Future Vision: Single Presidency	The extent to which respondents support that BiH should have a single presidency.
Gender Equality Mindset	The extent to which respondents acknowledge that men and women share equal responsibilities, rights and capabilities to contribute to society and do not support traditional gender stereotypes.
Gratitude	The extent to which respondents appreciate people, events, situations and assets in their life.
Group Grievance	The extent to which the respondent feels that the ethnic or social group they identify with is treated unfairly by the government.
Growth Mindset	The extent to which respondents are driven to expand their own knowledge, implement feedback and criticism, and improve themselves.
Importance of Identity	The degree of importance that the respondent ascribes to their ethnic identity.
Inclusive Civic Identity	The extent to which respondents acknowledge an overarching culture, identity and shared way of life across all residents of BiH, regardless of ethnicity.
Income Level	The average monthly net income of each household. 0 corresponds to no income, 10 corresponds to an income exceeding 7000 KM.
Information Consumption	The extent to which respondents use different sources to obtain information about current political and social affairs, including their social network, social media, television.
Information Consumption: Online Sources or Social Media	The extent to which respondents use online outlets and social media to obtain information about current political and social affairs.
Information Consumption: Traditional Media	The extent to which respondents use traditional media (television, radio, newspapers) to obtain information about current political and social affairs.
Islamophobia	The extent to which respondents agree with prejudicial stereotypes about Muslims, including that Islam promotes violence, that Islam is incompatible with the values of BiH, that Muslim women in BiH should not be allowed to wear religious clothing.
Justification of Violence	The extent to which respondents condone the use of violence to achieve political goals or social change.
Life Satisfaction	The extent to which respondents are satisfied with their current job, personal life and health level.
Marginalisation	The extent to which the respondent has felt socially excluded or discriminated against on the basis of certain social features (including education and income level, gender, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, political views or health status).
Mental Wellbeing	An overall measure of respondents' mental wellbeing, including depressive tendencies, apathy for day-to-day activities, isolation from other people, tendency to suffer from traumatic memories or dreams.
Negotiation	The extent to which respondents are willing to listen to alternative solutions during a dispute, and their capacity to develop solutions that are welcome by all parties in a conflict situation.
Obstacles to Engagement	The extent to which respondents believe that their civic participation is limited by certain structural, systemic, or social barriers.
Passive Citizenship	The extent to which respondents are unwilling to solve challenges in their community, preferring to focus on their own affairs.

Passive Citizenship Orientation	The extent to which respondents are unwilling to devote an effort to changing current conditions in their community, preferring to focus on their own affairs.
Personal Security	The extent to which respondents feel safe from violence in their daily life, including in their community, and how confident they are that the police can provide protection in their community.
Political Security	The extent to which respondents feel that they can freely exercise their political and civil rights, including participating in religious practices, expressing political views and participating in historical commemoration days.
Positive Feelings Towards Bosniaks	The degree to which respondents feel warm and positive feelings (as opposed to cold and negative feelings) towards Bosniaks.
Positive Feelings Towards Croats	The degree to which respondents feel warm and positive feelings (as opposed to cold and negative feelings) towards Croats.
Positive Feelings Towards Serbs	The degree to which respondents feel warm and positive feelings (as opposed to cold and negative feelings) towards Serbs.
Religiosity	The degree of importance of religion in the respondent's daily life.
Resilience Against Ethnonationalist Ideology	A measure of how resilient respondents are to developing an ethnonationalist ideology in the presence of certain stressors, such as economic stress, exposure to ethnonationalist narratives, exposure to interethnic conflict and divisive information consumption.
Resilience Against Violent Civic Behaviour	A measure of how resilient respondents are to exhibiting violent civic behaviours if they support an ethnonationalist ideology.
Resilience for Remaining Active in the Face of Economic Stress	A measure of how resilient respondents are to remaining active in the face of economic stress.
Resilience for Remaining Active in the Face of a Lack of Civic Spaces	A measure of how resilient respondents are to remaining active even when they do not have access to civic spaces.
Respect for Human Rights	The extent to which respondents acknowledge that certain rights and liberties are necessary for a well-functioning, cohesive society. This measurement includes equal pay for equal work, freedom of expression and belief, associational rights, personal autonomy.
Responsibility for Conflict	The extent to which respondens are willing to accept that members of their ethnic group were not only victms but also perpetrators during the war in BiH, and that their ethnic group should apologise for crimes committed against other groups during the conflict.
Satisfaction with Course of Economy	The extent to which respondents are satisfied with the course of the economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Satisfaction with Delivery of Healthcare	The extent to which respondents are satisfied with the delivery of healthcare in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Satisfaction with Interethnic Relations	The extent to which respondents are satisfied with interethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Satisfaction with Passing and Implementation of Legislature	The extent to which respondents are satisfied with the government passing and implementing laws in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Satisfaction with Quality of Education	The extent to which respondents are satisfied with the quality of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Satisfaction with Security	The extent to which respondents are satisfied with security in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Sense of Civic Responsibility	The extent to which respondents believe that ordinary people can make a change in Bosnia and Herzegovina, their willingness to devote their time to achieve positive societal change, and the responsibility they feel for the future of BiH.
Social Anxiety Towards Bosniaks	The average extent to which respondents feel threatened in the presence of Bosniaks.
Social Anxiety Towards Croats	The average extent to which respondents feel threatened in the presence of Croats.
Social Anxiety Towards Serbs	The average extent to which respondents feel threatened in the presence of Serbs.
Social Connectedness	The overall extent to which respondents can rely on family, friends and their community; the loyalty, responsiveness and support that these networks provide.

Social Connectedness: Community	The extent to which respondents have friendly relations with their neighbours, relying on each other, exchanging favours, and supporting members of their community.
Social Connectedness: Family	The extent to which respondents feel encouragement and support from their family, the loyalty within the family and bonds they share.
Social Connectedness: Friends	The extent to which respondents can count on their friends and whether their friends are responsive to their personal needs.
Social Distance Towards Bosniaks	The average extent to which respondents would not accept Bosniaks as close relatives by marriage, personal friends or coworkers.
Social Distance Towards Croats	The average extent to which respondents would not accept Croats as close relatives by marriage, personal friends or coworkers.
Social Distance Towards Jews	The average extent to which respondents would not accept Jews as close relatives by marriage, personal friends or coworkers.
Social Distance Towards Serbs	The average extent to which respondents would not accept Serbs as close relatives by marriage, personal friends or coworkers.
Social Threat	The extent to which respondents feel that sharing a space and interacting with other ethnic groups poses a threat to the cultural identity of their ethnic group, the religious values of their community, and the crime rate in their community.
Social Tolerance	The extent to which respondents would be willing to interact with and accept members of different social groups as part of their community (e.g. foreign workers, the LGBTQ+ community, people with different religions, people who sympathise with extremist movements).
Social Tolerance Towards Extremist Groups	The extent to which respondents are tolerant of people who sympathise with extremist groups (Ustaša movement, Četniks movement, Salafi Muslims).
Social Tolerance Towards Foreign Workers	The extent to which respondents are tolerant of foreign workers.
Social Tolerance Towards Jews	The extent to which respondents are tolerant of Jews.
Social Tolerance Towards People from a Different Ethnic Group	The extent to which respondents are tolerant of people from a different ethnic group.
Social Tolerance Towards People the LGBTQ+ Community	The extent to which respondents are tolerant of members of the LGBTQ+ community.
Social Tolerance Towards People who Sympathise with the Četniks Movement	The extent to which respondents are tolerant of people who sympathise with the Četniks Movement.
Social Tolerance Towards People who Sympathise with the Ustaša Movement	The extent to which respondents are tolerant of people who sympathise with the Ustaša Movement.
Social Tolerance Towards People with a Different Religion	The extent to which respondents are tolerant of people with a different religion to their own.
Social Tolerance Towards Refugees or Asylum Seekers from other Countries	The extent to which respondents are tolerant of refugees or asylum seekers from other countries.
Social Tolerance Towards Returnees	The extent to which respondents are tolerant of refugees.
Social Tolerance Towards Roma	The extent to which respondents are tolerant of Roma.
Social Tolerance Towards Salafi Muslims	The extent to which respondents are tolerant of Salafi Muslims.
Štela (Informal payments)	The extent to which respondents have offered informal payments, financial or in-kind favours to their personal connections in order to access more efficient or effective government services.
Stereotypes Towards Bosniaks	The average extent to which respondents believe that Bosniaks are dishonest, violent or all the same.
Stereotypes Towards Croats	The average extent to which respondents believe that Croats are dishonest, violent or all the same.

Stereotypes Towards Serbs	The average extent to which respondents believe that Serbs are dishonest, violent or all the same.
Strength of Identity: Bosniak	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group. The score was only calculated for respondents identifying as a member of this ethnic group.
Strength of Identity: Bosnian	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group.
Strength of Identity: Catholic	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group.
Strength of Identity: Citizen of BiH	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group.
Strength of Identity: Citizen of FBiH	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group.
Strength of Identity: Citizen of RS	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group.
Strength of Identity: City	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group.
Strength of Identity: Croat	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group. The score was only calculated for respondents identifying as a member of this ethnic group.
Strength of Identity: European	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group.
Strength of Identity: Muslim	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group.
Strength of Identity: Orthodox	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group.
Strength of Identity: Regional	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group.
Strength of Identity: Serb	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group. The score was only calculated for respondents identifying as a member of this ethnic group.
Strength of Identity: Yugoslav	The extent to which the respondent identifies with this description or group.
Support for Bosniak Nationalist Narratives	The extent to which respondents of a particular ethnic group agree with nationalist narratives relevant to their ethnic group, including (but not limited to) victimhood narratives, glorification of military figures, legitimisation of extremist political movements and the endorsement of territorial or physical barriers in which one ethnic group is a majority.
Support for Croat Nationalist Narratives	The extent to which respondents of a particular ethnic group agree with nationalist narratives relevant to their ethnic group, including (but not limited to) victimhood narratives, glorification of military figures, legitimisation of extremist political movements and the endorsement of territorial or physical barriers in which one ethnic group is a majority.
Support for Inclusive Education Reform	The extent to which respondents support educational reform to teach inclusive history, remove discriminatory or politicised curricula, abolish the "two schools under one roof" system.
Support for Multiethnic Politics	The extent to which respondents support the representation of all ethnic groups by political parties, and not just the interests of one ethnic group.
Support for Religion in Politics	The extent to which the respondent believes religion should have a role in politics.
Support for RS Separatism	The extent to which respondents are supportive of Republika Srpska separatism.
Support for Salafi Narratives	The extent to which Muslim respondents agree with narratives associated with the Salafi movement.
Support for Serb Nationalist Narratives	The extent to which respondents of a particular ethnic group agree with nationalist narratives relevant to their ethnic group, including (but not limited to) victimhood narratives, glorification of military figures, legitimisation of extremist political movements and the endorsement of territorial or physical barriers in which one ethnic group is a majority.
Tension with Outgroups	A composite indicator measuring the extent of mistrust, stereotypes, social distance, social anxiety, and negative feelings that respondents display towards people from other ethnic groups.
Tolerant Religiosity	The extent to which respondents are able to see universal truths across different religions, including that violence in the name of God cannot be justified and that God cares for all people, regardless of religion or ethnicity.

Trust in All Institutions	The level of trust in different institutions in society including international, national, local and media institutions.
Trust in all Media Sources	The average level of trust in a range of media sources. This includes independent, state-wide, entity-wide, and regional outlets, accessible either online, on television, in written press and on the radio.
Trust in all Political Parties	The level of trust that respondents have in the party they support and in other parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Trust in Entity Institutions	The level of trust in entity institutions and government.
Trust in Government Institutions	The level of trust in local, entity and national institutions and governments.
Trust in International Intergovernmental Organisations	The level of trust in international intergovernmental organisations, such as the EU, the UN.
Trust in Local Institutions	The level of trust in municipal or city-level institutons and government, such as mayors, MZ councils, local administration, police.
Trust in Local NGOs and Citizens Associations	The level of trust in local NGOs and Citizens' Associations.
Trust in Nongovernmental and Religious Institutions	The level of trust in key non-governmental institutions such as religious institutions, local NGOs and citizens' associations, and international organizations.
Trust in Other Political Parties	The level of trust in political parties that the respondent does not support.
Trust in Own Political Party	The level of trust in the political party that the respondent supports.
Trust in Religious Institutions	The level of trust in religious institutions, such as the Islamic Community in BiH, the Serbian Orthodox Church in BiH, the Roman Catholic Church in BiH.
Trust National Institutions	The level of trust in national institutions and government at state level.
Trust Towards Bosniaks	The average extent of trust that respondents feel towards Bosniaks.
Trust Towards Croats	The average extent of trust that respondents feel towards Croats.
Trust Towards Jews	The average extent of trust that respondents feel towards Jews.
Trust Towards People in General	The average extent of trust that respondents feel towards people in general.
Trust Towards Roma	The average extent of trust that respondents feel towards Roma.
Trust Towards Serbs	The average extent of trust that respondents feel towards Serbs.
Violent Citizenship	The extent to which respondents would attempt to solve challenges in their community using violent means.
Violent Citizenship Orientation	The extent to which respondents are willing to work to change current conditions in their community, using all means of change including violence.
Violent Civic Behaviour	A composite measure of respondents' aggression, their justification of violence for political or social change, and the extent to which they would use violent means to solve challenges in their community.
Wartime Perspective Taking	The extent to which respondents are able to consider the position, point of view and feelings of other ethnic groups, during the war in BiH.
Willingness to Participate in Civic Initiatives	The extent to which respondents are willing to participate in civic initiatives across different themes, including history, culture, environment, anti-corruption activities.

Appendix

The table below gives statistical information about the structural equation models and regression presented in this report. Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), and Tucker−Lewis index (TLI) are fit indices used to assess how well the data fits the model.

Model	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	Sample Size	Figure Number
Ethnonationalist Ideology	0.91	0.84	0.048	2949	Figure 17
Support for Salafi Narratives	0.84	0.90	0.049	1452	Figure 18
Positive Citizenship	0.97	0.84	0.051	3538	Figure 11

Model			R Squared	Sample Size	Figure 11
Tension with Outgroups			0.55	3637	

Table 17: Model fit indices and sample sizes.

N=3538 (Representative Sample all Ages) **TLI 0.844** **CFI 0.967**		
Driver	**Beta weight**	**Outcome**
Civic Awareness	0.38	
Information Consumption	0.26	
Growth Mindset	0.19	
Trust in Local NGOs	0.12	
Education Level	0.08	Active Civic Behaviour
Wartime Perspective Taking	0.08	
Civic Satisfaction	0.06	
Lack of Access to Civic Spaces	-0.05	
Economic Stress	-0.06	
Intergroup Harmony towards Outgroups	0.32	
Critical Media Literacy	0.12	
Wartime Perspective Taking	0.07	
Growth Mindset	0.06	Inclusive Civic Identity
Economic Stress	0.04	
Lack of Access to Civic Spaces	-0.03	
Information Consumption	-0.05	
Civic Awareness	0.15	
Information Consumption	0.14	
Critical Media Literacy	0.11	
Growth Mindset	0.06	
Trust in Local NGOs	0.05	Sense of Civic Responsibility
Education Level	0.05	
Civic Satisfaction	0.04	
Wartime Perspective Taking	0.04	
Economic Stress	-0.09	

Table 18: Model results for Positive Citizenship Model, full representative sample

N=1948 (Youth Representative & Boost Sample) TLI 0.815 CFI 0.960		
Driver	Beta weight	Outcome
Civic Awareness	0.46	
Information Consumption	0.22	Active Civic Behaviour
Growth Mindset	0.09	
Trust in Local NGOs	0.14	
Education Level	-	
Wartime Perspective Taking	0.11	
Civic Satisfaction	-	
Lack of Access to Civic Spaces	-	
Critical Media Literacy	0.13	
Economic Stress	–	
Intergroup Harmony towards Outgroups	0.27	
Critical Media Literacy	0.07	
Wartime Perspective Taking	0.07	
Growth Mindset	0.09	Inclusive Civic Identity
Civic Satisfaction	0.06	
Economic Stress	-	
Lack of Access to Civic Spaces	-	
Information Consumption	-0.05	
Civic Awareness	0.19	
Information Consumption	0.13	
Critical Media Literacy	0.16	
Growth Mindset	-	
Trust in Local NGOs	0.07	Sense of Civic Responsibility
Education Level	0.05	
Civic Satisfaction	-	
Wartime Perspective Taking	-	
Economic Stress	-0.06	

Table 19: Model results for Positive Citizenship Model, Youth Representative and Boost samples

N=2949 (all Ages) TLI 0.84 CFI 0.91		
Driver	**Beta weight**	**Outcome**
Economic Stress	0.20	Ethnonationalist Ideology
Exposure to Nationalist Narratives: Personal Life	0.33	
Information Consumption	0.12	
Exposure to Interethnic Conflict	0.07	
Economic Stress	-0.13	Active Civic Behaviour
Exposure to Nationalist Narratives: Personal Life	0.40	
Information Consumption	0.35	
Exposure to Interethnic Conflict	0.16	
Ethnonationalist Ideology	-0.25	
Economic Stress	0.00	Tension with Outgroups
Exposure to Nationalist Narratives: Personal Life	0.00	
Information Consumption	0.11	
Exposure to Interethnic Conflict	0.00	
Ethnonationalist Ideology	0.87	
Economic Stress	0.18	Violent Civic Behaviour
Exposure to Nationalist Narratives: Personal Life	0.16	
Information Consumption	0.18	
Exposure to Interethnic Conflict	-0.14	
Ethnonationalist Ideology	0.47	

Table 20: Model results for Ethnonationalist Ideology Model, run on full sample (only participants who identify as Bosniak, Croat or Serb).

N=1452 (all ages, Bosniak Muslims) TLI 0.90 CFI 0.84		
Driver	**Beta weight**	**Outcome**
Economic Stress	0.11	Support for Salafi Narratives
Exposure to Salafi Narratives: Personal Life	0.13	
Information Consumption	0.00	
Exposure to Interethnic Conflict	0.15	
Economic Stress	-0.18	Active Civic Behaviour
Exposure to Salafi Narratives: Personal Life	0.26	
Information Consumption	0.44	
Exposure to Interethnic Conflict	0.00	
Support for Salafi Narratives	0.00	

Economic Stress	0.24	
Exposure to Salafi Narratives: Personal Life	0.15	
Information Consumption	0.25	Tension with Outgroups
Exposure to Interethnic Conflict	0.13	
Support for Salafi Narratives	0.18	
Economic Stress	0.36	
Exposure to Salafi Narratives: Personal Life	0.23	
Information Consumption	0.42	Violent Civic Behaviour
Exposure to Interethnic Conflict	-0.20	
Support for Salafi Narratives	0.10	

Table 21: Model results for Support for Salafi Narratives Model

N=3637 (All ages representative) R Squared 0.55		
Driver	Beta weight	Outcome
Rurality	0.04	
Ethnonationalist Ideology	0.20	
Cultural Distance Towards Outgroups	0.35	
Islamophobia	0.17	
Religiosity	0.08	
Štela	0.09	
Marginalisation	0.07	
Economic Stress	-0.04	Tension with Outgroups
Civic Satisfaction	-0.07	
Life Satisfaction	-0.06	
Trust in Local Institutions	-0.02	
Respect for Human Rights	-0.08	
Contact Quantity with Outgroups	-0.20	
Critical Media Literacy	-0.05	

Table 22: Model results for Tension with Outgroups.

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